This file is part of IDEAS, which uses RePEc data


[ Papers | Articles | Software | Books | Chapters | Authors | Institutions | JEL Classification | NEP reports | Search | New papers by email | Author registration | Rankings | Volunteers | FAQ | Blog | Help! ]

Quality Uncertainty Mitigates Product Differentiation

Author info | Abstract | Publisher info | Download info | Related research | Statistics
Author Info
Helmut Bester

Additional information is available for the following registered author(s):

Abstract

I present the idea that imperfect information about the (vertical) quality characteristics of goods reduces the sellers' incentives for horizontal product differentiation. As a result, the equilibrium outcome may be characterized by "minimum differentiation." In a spatial framework this implies that firms tend to choose head-on competition by agglomerating at the same location. It may happen that consumers benefit from imperfect information about product quality.

Download Info
To download:

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. Information about this may be contained in the File-Format links below. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help file. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.

File URL: http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0741-6261%28199824%2929%3A4%3C828%3AQUMPD%3E2.0.CO%3B2-5&origin=repec
File Format: application/pdf
File Function: full text
Download Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to JSTOR subscribers. See http://www.jstor.org for details.

As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version under "Related research" (further below) or search for a different version of it.

Publisher Info
Article provided by The RAND Corporation in its journal RAND Journal of Economics.

Volume (Year): 29 (1998)
Issue (Month): 4 (Winter)
Pages: 828-844
Download reference. The following formats are available: HTML, plain text, BibTeX, RIS (EndNote), ReDIF
Handle: RePEc:rje:randje:v:29:y:1998:i:winter:p:828-844

Contact details of provider:
Web page: http://www.rje.org

Order Information:
Web: http://gemini.econ.umd.edu/cgi-bin/rje_online.cgi

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its listing, contact: ().

Related research
Keywords:

Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

  1. Andrea Mangani & Paolo Patelli, 2002. "The Max-Min Principle of Product Differentiation: An Experimental Analysis," LEM Papers Series 2002/05, Laboratory of Economics and Management (LEM), Sant'Anna School of Advanced Studies, Pisa, Italy. [Downloadable!]
  2. Carlos Gutiérrez-Hita & Martin Peitz, 2001. "Retailer Locations, Local Supply And Price Policies," Working Papers. Serie AD 2001-26, Instituto Valenciano de Investigaciones Económicas, S.A. (Ivie). [Downloadable!]
  3. Andrew F. Daughety & Jennifer F. Reinganum, 2006. "Products Liability, Signaling and Disclosure," Working Papers 0625, Department of Economics, Vanderbilt University. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  4. Andrew F. Daughety & Jennifer F. Reinganum, 2007. "Communicating Quality: A Unified Model of Disclosure and Signaling," Working Papers 0703, Department of Economics, Vanderbilt University. [Downloadable!]
  5. Hugh Gravelle & Giuliano Masiero, . "Quality incentives in a regulated market with imperfect information and switching costs: capitation in general practice," Discussion Papers 00/18, Department of Economics, University of York. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  6. Chrysovalantou Milliou & Emmanuel Petrakis, 2004. "Business-to-business electronic marketplaces: Joining a public or creating a private," International Journal of Finance & Economics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 9(2), pages 99-112. [Downloadable!]
  7. Ronald B. Davies, 2000. "Abstinence from Child Labor and Profit Seeking," University of Oregon Economics Department Working Papers 2000-1, University of Oregon Economics Department, revised 01 Aug 2002. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  8. Bontems, P. & Meunier, V., 2006. "Advertising and price signaling of quality in a duopoly with endogenous locations," Economics Working Paper Archive (Toulouse) 200603, French Institute for Agronomy Research (INRA), Economics Laboratory in Toulouse (ESR Toulouse). [Downloadable!]
  9. Maarten C.W. Janssen & Santanu Roy, 2007. "Signaling Quality Through Prices in an Oligopoly," Departmental Working Papers 0709, Southern Methodist University, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  10. Heiko A. Gerlach & Thomas Rønde & Konrad Stahl, 2004. "Project Choice and Risk in R&D," CIE Discussion Papers 2004-01, University of Copenhagen. Department of Economics. Centre for Industrial Economics. [Downloadable!]
  11. Gerlach, Heiko A. & Rønde, Thomas & Stahl, Konrad O., 2002. "Market and Technical Risk in R&D," CEPR Discussion Papers 3450, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  12. Christian Schultz, 2007. "Transparency and Product Variety," CIE Discussion Papers 2007-13, University of Copenhagen. Department of Economics. Centre for Industrial Economics. [Downloadable!]
  13. Grönqvist, Erik & Lundin, Douglas, 2006. "Incentives for Clinical Trials," Working Paper Series in Economics and Finance 636, Stockholm School of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  14. Giuliano Masiero & Hugh Gravelle, 2000. "Quality incentives under a capitation regime: the role of patient expectations," Departemental Working Papers 2000-07, Department of Economics University of Milan Italy. [Downloadable!]
  15. Patrick Bolton & Xavier Freixas & Joel Shapiro, 2004. "Conflicts of Interest, Information Provision and Competition in Banking," Economics Working Papers 760, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra. [Downloadable!]
  16. Andrew F. Daughety & Jennifer F. Reinganum, 2005. "Imperfect Competition and Quality Signaling," Working Papers 0520, Department of Economics, Vanderbilt University. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  17. Philippe Bontems & Valérie Meunier, 2005. "Advertising and Price Signaling of Quality in a Duopoly with Endogenous Locations," CIE Discussion Papers 2005-10, University of Copenhagen. Department of Economics. Centre for Industrial Economics. [Downloadable!]
  18. Kurt R. Brekke & Robert Nuscheler & Odd Rune Straume, 2005. "Gatekeeping in Health Care," CESifo Working Paper Series CESifo Working Paper No. , CESifo GmbH. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  19. Patrick Bolton & Xavier Freixas & Joel Shapiro, 2004. "Conflicts of Interest, Information Provision, and Competition in Banking," NBER Working Papers 10571, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  20. Gerhard Orosel & Klaus G. Zauner, 2004. "Vertical Product Differentiation When Quality is Unobservable to Buyers," CESifo Working Paper Series CESifo Working Paper No. , CESifo GmbH. [Downloadable!]
  21. Rajeev Tyagi, 2005. "On Firms' Preferences for Product Differentiation," Economics Bulletin, Economics Bulletin, vol. 12(17), pages 1-8. [Downloadable!]
  22. Alberto Cavaliere, 2004. "Price Competition with Information Disparities in a Vertically Differentiated Duopoly," Working Papers 2004.39, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei. [Downloadable!]
  23. Marcel Boyer & Philippe Mahenc & Michel Moreaux, 2002. "Asymmetric Information And Product Differentiation," CIRANO Working Papers 2002s-16, CIRANO. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  24. Joel Shapiro & Patrick Bolton & Xavier Freixas, 2004. "Conflicts of Interest and Credible Information Provision by Specialized and One-Stop Banks," Econometric Society 2004 North American Winter Meetings 132, Econometric Society. [Downloadable!]
Statistics
Access and download statistics

Did you know? It is the publishers that input data about their publications, as there is no staff at RePEc.

This page was last updated on 2008-7-20.

This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Department of Economics, College of Liberal Arts and Sciences, University of Connecticut using RePEc data on a server sponsored by the Society for Economic Dynamics.