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Preemptive Search and R&D Clustering

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  • James Cardon
  • Dan Sasaki

Abstract

While many preceding studies discuss the equilibrium intensity of R&D, this article focuses on its equilibrium direction. There can be a pure-strategy equilibrium in which multiple firms "cluster," i.e., attempt to develop the same technology even if (i) potential technologies are ex ante equally promising, (ii) each technology can be patented by no more than one firm, and (iii) there are no informational spillovers among firms. Economic applications of this clustering result are not confined to R&D. Any situation where agents are racing in search of exclusive economic opportunities can be an example of this model.

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Bibliographic Info

Article provided by The RAND Corporation in its journal RAND Journal of Economics.

Volume (Year): 29 (1998)
Issue (Month): 2 (Summer)
Pages: 324-338

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Handle: RePEc:rje:randje:v:29:y:1998:i:summer:p:324-338

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Cited by:
  1. Luca Lambertini & Piero Tedeschi, 2007. "On the Social Desirability of Patents for Sequential Innovations in a Vertically Differentiated Market," Journal of Economics, Springer, Springer, vol. 90(2), pages 193-214, March.
  2. Nisvan Erkal & Deborah Minehart, 2008. "Optimal Sharing Strategies in Dynamic Games of Research and Development," Department of Economics - Working Papers Series, The University of Melbourne 1038, The University of Melbourne.
  3. Gerlach, Heiko A. & Rønde, Thomas & Stahl, Konrad O., 2002. "Market and Technical Risk in R&D," CEPR Discussion Papers, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers 3450, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  4. Jay Pil Choi & Heiko Gerlach, 2011. "Selection Biases in Complementary R&D Projects," CESifo Working Paper Series, CESifo Group Munich 3425, CESifo Group Munich.
  5. Fier, Andreas & Harhoff, Dietmar, 2001. "Die Evolution der bundesdeutschen Forschungs- und Technologiepolitik: Rückblick und Bestandsaufnahme," ZEW Discussion Papers, ZEW - Zentrum für Europäische Wirtschaftsforschung / Center for European Economic Research 01-61, ZEW - Zentrum für Europäische Wirtschaftsforschung / Center for European Economic Research.

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