Pricing Regulation Under Bypass Competition
AbstractWe analyze optimal pricing policies in local telecommunications subject to bypass for the access of long-distance carriers. We first consider the case of a regulated monopoly that operates the local network and has access to an additional technology (bypass) more efficient for large customers. We then study how competition in bypass affects the optimal nonlinear pricing policy and the resulting allocation. When transfers are allowed between the regulator and the network operator, bypass competition benefits consumers at the expense of the taxpayer, otherwise it benefits large consumers but hurts small ones.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by The RAND Corporation in its journal RAND Journal of Economics.
Volume (Year): 29 (1998)
Issue (Month): 2 (Summer)
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Web page: http://www.rje.org
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- Mark Armstrong & David E.M. Sappington, 2006.
"Regulation, Competition and Liberalization,"
Journal of Economic Literature,
American Economic Association, vol. 44(2), pages 325-366, June.
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