Advanced Search
MyIDEAS: Login to save this article or follow this journal

Dynamic R&D Competition with Learning

Contents:

Author Info

  • David A. Malueg
  • Shunichi O. Tsutsui

Abstract

To account for the possibility that firms are unsure about the ease of innovation, we formulate a differential game of R&D competition with an unknown hazard rate. We show, as time passes with success, firms become more pessimistic about eventual innovation, reducing their R&D investment and possibly exiting the race. An increase in the number of competing firms tends to increase firms' R&D intensities, for given beliefs, but because beliefs evolve at different rates depending on the number of firms in the race, time paths of R&D investment intensity are not unambiguously ordered with respect to the number of competing firms.

Download Info

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
File URL: http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0741-6261%28199724%2928%3A4%3C751%3ADRCWL%3E2.0.CO%3B2-Y&origin=repec
File Function: full text
Download Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to JSTOR subscribers. See http://www.jstor.org for details.

As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version under "Related research" (further below) or search for a different version of it.

Bibliographic Info

Article provided by The RAND Corporation in its journal RAND Journal of Economics.

Volume (Year): 28 (1997)
Issue (Month): 4 (Winter)
Pages: 751-772

as in new window
Handle: RePEc:rje:randje:v:28:y:1997:i:winter:p:751-772

Contact details of provider:
Web page: http://www.rje.org

Order Information:
Web: https://editorialexpress.com/cgi-bin/rje_online.cgi

Related research

Keywords:

References

No references listed on IDEAS
You can help add them by filling out this form.

Citations

Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
as in new window

Cited by:
  1. Nisvan Erkal & Suzanne Scotchmer, 2009. "Scarcity of Ideas and R&D Options: Use it, Lose it or Bank it," NBER Working Papers 14940, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  2. Martin W. Cripps & Godfrey Keller & Sven Rady, 2002. "Strategic Experimentation: The Case of Poisson Bandits," CESifo Working Paper Series, CESifo Group Munich 737, CESifo Group Munich.
  3. Rosenberg, Dinah & Salomon, Antoine & Vieille, Nicolas, 2013. "On games of strategic experimentation," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 82(C), pages 31-51.
  4. Dinah Rosenberg & Antoine Salomon & Nicolas Vieille, 2010. "On Games of Strategic Experimentation," Working Papers, HAL hal-00579613, HAL.
  5. Jing-Yuan, Chiou, 2012. "In the shadow of giants," MPRA Paper 37033, University Library of Munich, Germany.

Lists

This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

Statistics

Access and download statistics

Corrections

When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:rje:randje:v:28:y:1997:i:winter:p:751-772. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: ().

If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.