Dynamic R&D Competition with Learning
AbstractTo account for the possibility that firms are unsure about the ease of innovation, we formulate a differential game of R&D competition with an unknown hazard rate. We show, as time passes with success, firms become more pessimistic about eventual innovation, reducing their R&D investment and possibly exiting the race. An increase in the number of competing firms tends to increase firms' R&D intensities, for given beliefs, but because beliefs evolve at different rates depending on the number of firms in the race, time paths of R&D investment intensity are not unambiguously ordered with respect to the number of competing firms.
Download InfoIf you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version under "Related research" (further below) or search for a different version of it.
Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by The RAND Corporation in its journal RAND Journal of Economics.
Volume (Year): 28 (1997)
Issue (Month): 4 (Winter)
Contact details of provider:
Web page: http://www.rje.org
You can help add them by filling out this form.
CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
- Dinah Rosenberg & Antoine Salomon & Nicolas Vieille, 2010. "On Games of Strategic Experimentation," Working Papers hal-00579613, HAL.
- Jing-Yuan, Chiou, 2012. "In the shadow of giants," MPRA Paper 37033, University Library of Munich, Germany.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: ().
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.