This file is part of IDEAS, which uses RePEc data


[ Papers | Articles | Software | Books | Chapters | Authors | Institutions | JEL Classification | NEP reports | Search | New papers by email | Author registration | Rankings | Volunteers | FAQ | Blog | Help! ]

Moral Hazard and Risk Spreading in Partnerships

Author info | Abstract | Publisher info | Download info | Related research | Statistics
Author Info
Martin Gaynor
Paul Gertler

Additional information is available for the following registered author(s):

Abstract

Partnerships provide a classic example of the tradeoff between risk spreading and moral hazard. The degree to which firms choose to spread risk and sacrifice efficiency incentives depends upon risk preferences, for which data are typically unavailable. We use a unique dataset on medical group practice to investigate this tradeoff. Risk aversion leads to compensation arrangements, which spread risk through greater sharing of revenues. We find that compensation arrangements with greater degrees of revenue sharing significantly reduce physician effort. The results imply that changing the method of physician payment from fee-for-service to capitation will dramatically reduce physician effort.

Download Info
To download:

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. Information about this may be contained in the File-Format links below. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.

File URL: http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0741-6261%28199524%2926%3A4%3C591%3AMHARSI%3E2.0.CO%3B2-8&origin=repec
File Format: application/pdf
File Function: full text
Download Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to JSTOR subscribers. See http://www.jstor.org for details.

As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version under "Related research" (further below) or search for a different version of it.

Publisher Info
Article provided by The RAND Corporation in its journal RAND Journal of Economics.

Volume (Year): 26 (1995)
Issue (Month): 4 (Winter)
Pages: 591-613
Download reference. The following formats are available: HTML (with abstract), plain text (with abstract), BibTeX, RIS (EndNote, RefMan, ProCite), ReDIF
Handle: RePEc:rje:randje:v:26:y:1995:i:winter:p:591-613

Contact details of provider:
Web page: http://www.rje.org

Order Information:
Web: http://gemini.econ.umd.edu/cgi-bin/rje_online.cgi

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its listing, contact: ().

Related research
Keywords:

Other versions of this item:

Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)
  1. Jostein Grytten & Dorthe Holst & Irene Skau, 2009. "Incentives and remuneration systems in dental services," International Journal of Health Care Finance and Economics, Springer, vol. 9(3), pages 259-278, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  2. Tomas Philipson & George Zanjani, 1997. "Consumption vs. Production of Insurance," NBER Working Papers 6225, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  3. Etienne Dumont & Bernard Fortin & Nicolas Jacquemet & Bruce S. Shearer, 2008. "Physicians’ Multitasking and Incentives: Empirical Evidence from a Natural Experiment," CIRANO Working Papers 2008s-20, CIRANO. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  4. Martin Gaynor, 1995. "Issues in the Industrial Organization of the Market for Physician Services," NBER Working Papers 4695, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  5. Bernard Fortin & Nicolas Jacquemet & Bruce Shearer, 2008. "Policy Analysis in the health-services market: accounting for quality and quantity," Université Paris1 Panthéon-Sorbonne (Post-Print and Working Papers) halshs-00305309_v1, HAL. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  6. Robert Rosenman & Daniel Friesner, 2004. "Scope and scale inefficiencies in physician practices," Health Economics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 13(11), pages 1091-1116. [Downloadable!]
  7. Martin Gaynor & James B Rebitzer & Lowell J Taylor, 2002. "Incentives in HMO's," The Centre for Market and Public Organisation 03/089, Department of Economics, University of Bristol, UK. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  8. Pascal Courty & Gerald R. Marschke, 2008. "On the Sorting of Physicians across Medical Occupations," NBER Working Papers 14502, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  9. Sarah Brown & Lisa Farrell & Mark N. Harris & John G. Sessions, 2002. "Risk Preference And Employment Contract Type," Department of Economics - Working Papers Series 845, The University of Melbourne. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  10. William E. Encinosa III & Martin Gaynor & James B. Rebitzer, 2005. "The Sociology of Groups and the Economics of Incentives: Theory and Evidence on Compensation Systems," IZA Discussion Papers 1851, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA). [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  11. Tushar Kanti Nandi, 2006. "Parametric and Semiparametric Estimation of the Adoption of Work Teams," Department of Economics University of Siena 484, Department of Economics, University of Siena. [Downloadable!]
  12. Martin Gaynor & Deborah Haas-Wilson, 1998. "Change, Consolidation, and Competition in Health Care Markets," NBER Working Papers 6701, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  13. Mary A. Burke & Kislaya Prasad, 2005. "Contracts with social multipliers," Working Papers 05-17, Federal Reserve Bank of Boston. [Downloadable!]
  14. Olmos, Marta Fernandez & Rosell-Martinez, Jorge & Espitia-Escuer, Manuel Antonio, 2008. "The yield/quality trade-off and contractual choice," 2008 Annual Meeting, July 27-29, 2008, Orlando, Florida 6065, American Agricultural Economics Association (New Name 2008: Agricultural and Applied Economics Association). [Downloadable!]
  15. Alan Morrison & William J. Wilhelm, Jr., 2003. "Partnership Firms, Reputation and Human Capital," OFRC Working Papers Series 2003fe02, Oxford Financial Research Centre. [Downloadable!]
  16. Lent, L. van, 1996. "The economics of an audit firm : The case of KPMG in the Netherlands," Research Memorandum 730, Tilburg University, Faculty of Economics and Business Administration. [Downloadable!]
  17. Mari Paz Espinosa & Inés Macho-Stadler, 2003. "Endogenous Formation of Competing Partnership with Moral Hazard," DFAEII Working Papers 200234, University of the Basque Country - Department of Foundations of Economic Analysis II. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  18. Sarah Brown & Karl Talyor, 2002. "Wage Growth, Human Capital and Risk Preference: Evidence From The British Household Panel Survey," Discussion Papers in Economics 02/14, Department of Economics, University of Leicester. [Downloadable!]
  19. Robert Gibbons, 1997. "Incentives and Careers in Organizations," NBER Working Papers 5705, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Statistics
Access and download statistics

Did you know? You can include your works in the database easily by uploading them on the Munich Personal RePEc Archive (MPRA) if you do not have access to an institutional RePEc archive.

This page was last updated on 2009-11-13.

This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Department of Economics, College of Liberal Arts and Sciences, University of Connecticut using RePEc data on a server sponsored by the Society for Economic Dynamics.