The Crowding-Out Effects of Long Duration of Patents
AbstractIn this article we demonstrate how a long duration of patents affects investment in new product development. We construct an overlapping-generations model of saving, investment, and product innovation and show that a long duration of patents results in a high aggregate value of monopoly firms that compete for the younger generation's savings with investment in new product development. We analyze the crowding-out effects of long duration of patents and their implications for individual's welfare under different patent regimes.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by The RAND Corporation in its journal RAND Journal of Economics.
Volume (Year): 24 (1993)
Issue (Month): 2 (Summer)
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Web page: http://www.rje.org
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- Gerlagh, Reyer & Kverndokk, Snorre & Rosendahl, Knut Einar, 2014. "The optimal time path of clean energy R&D policy when patents have finite lifetime," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 67(1), pages 2-19.
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