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Search Equilibrium with Endogenous Recall

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  • Andrew F. Daughety
  • Jennifer F. Reinganum

Abstract

In search models, the property of "recall" has heretofore been treated as exogenous, with a distinction made between models with "no recall" and models with "perfect recall." However, an alternative interpretation is that recall is provided by the firms. Then, "perfect recall" corresponds to holding the good forever, while "no recall" corresponds to a refusal to hold the good at all. Imperfect recall is provided if a firm agrees to hold the good for a finite number of periods. We show that the commonly observed practice of holding the good for some length of time, while the customer continues to shop elsewhere, can be an equilibrium strategy.

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Bibliographic Info

Article provided by The RAND Corporation in its journal RAND Journal of Economics.

Volume (Year): 23 (1992)
Issue (Month): 2 (Summer)
Pages: 184-202

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Handle: RePEc:rje:randje:v:23:y:1992:i:summer:p:184-202

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Cited by:
  1. Charles J. Thomas, 2012. "An Alternating-Offers Model of Multilateral Negotiations," Working Papers, Chapman University, Economic Science Institute 12-31, Chapman University, Economic Science Institute.
  2. Armstrong, Mark & Zhou, Jidong, 2010. "Exploding offers and buy-now discounts," MPRA Paper 22531, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  3. James D. Dana, 2000. "Competition in Price and Availability when Availability is Unobservable," Econometric Society World Congress 2000 Contributed Papers, Econometric Society 1450, Econometric Society.
  4. Brennan Platt & Nuray Akin, 2012. "A theory of search with recall and uncertain deadlines," 2012 Meeting Papers, Society for Economic Dynamics 777, Society for Economic Dynamics.
  5. Krasteva, Silvana & Yildirim, Huseyin, 2012. "On the role of confidentiality and deadlines in bilateral negotiations," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 75(2), pages 714-730.
  6. Andrew F. Daughety & Jennifer F. Reinganum, 2011. "Search, Bargaining, And Agency in the Market for Legal Services," Vanderbilt University Department of Economics Working Papers, Vanderbilt University Department of Economics 1106, Vanderbilt University Department of Economics.
  7. Ş. Akın & Brennan Platt, 2014. "A theory of search with deadlines and uncertain recall," Economic Theory, Springer, Springer, vol. 55(1), pages 101-133, January.

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