Slotting Allowances and Resale Price Maintenance: A Comparison of Facilitating Practices
AbstractProducers in a perfectly competitive industry compete to obtain shelf space at the retail level. Barring contract observability problems, slotting allowances are observed in equilibrium. Producers charge a high wholesale price, but they give back their profits via up-front payments to retailers. However, if the individual supplier-retailer wholesale price terms are unobservable by competitors, then resale price maintenance will be seen, but the coverage will not be universal. The equilibria can be ranked by the usual social welfare criteria. Resale price maintenance, though worse than simple marginal cost wholesale pricing, yields greater surplus than the slotting allowance equilibrium.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by The RAND Corporation in its journal RAND Journal of Economics.
Volume (Year): 22 (1991)
Issue (Month): 1 (Spring)
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