Market Power of Local Cable Television Franchises: Evidence from the Effects of Deregulation
AbstractThe 1989 Cable Act eliminated most price regulation of cable television operators, including the right of municipalities to enforce price terms in franchise agreements. Deregulation was justified, at least partially, by the contention that competition from other entertainment media eliminated any market power of cable franchises. We examine the value at sale of existing cable systems before and after deregulation. Assuming that this value represents the expected present value of future profits, deregulation had the predicted negligible effect on profits in cities with significant broadcast competition. However, profits appear to have increased in areas where the competition from broadcast television was less severe. We explore several explanations for this increase and conclude that significant market power is the most plausible explanation.
Download InfoIf you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version under "Related research" (further below) or search for a different version of it.
Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by The RAND Corporation in its journal RAND Journal of Economics.
Volume (Year): 21 (1990)
Issue (Month): 2 (Summer)
Contact details of provider:
Web page: http://www.rje.org
You can help add them by filling out this form.
CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
- John S. Ying & Mary T. Kelly, 2007.
"Testing the Effectiveness of Regulation and Competition on Cable Television Rates,"
07-07, University of Delaware, Department of Economics.
- Mary T. Kelly & John S. Ying, 2009. "Testing the Effectiveness of Regulation and Competition on Cable Television Rates," Villanova School of Business Department of Economics and Statistics Working Paper Series 3, Villanova School of Business Department of Economics and Statistics.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: ().
If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.
If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.
If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.
Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.