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Cable Franchise Renewals: Do Incumbent Firms Behave Opportunistically?

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Author Info
Mark A. Zupan
Abstract

Systematic empirical evidence has heretofore been lacking on the extent to which supplier opportunism at the time of contract renewal is a fundamental problem associated with franchise bidding schemes. At least for the case of local cable television distribution, this article suggests several theoretical reasons why bad behavior by an incumbent supplier may be the exception rather than the rule and a simple test for supplier opportunism at the time of franchise renewal. The simple test is employed to empirically analyze the terms of trade in a cross-sectional sample of recent cable franchise renewal contracts

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Publisher Info
Article provided by The RAND Corporation in its journal RAND Journal of Economics.

Volume (Year): 20 (1989)
Issue (Month): 4 (Winter)
Pages: 473-482
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Handle: RePEc:rje:randje:v:20:y:1989:i:winter:p:473-482

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  1. Zvika Neeman & Gerhard Oskar Orosel, 2004. "Contestable Licensing," The B.E. Journal of Economic Analysis & Policy, Berkeley Electronic Press, vol. 0(1). [Downloadable!]
  2. Stephen C Littlechild, 2002. "Competitive Bidding for a Long-Term Electricity Distribution Contract," Review of Network Economics, Concept Economics, vol. 1(1), pages 1-38, March. [Downloadable!]
  3. Eshien Chong & Freddy Huet & Stéphane Saussier & Faye Steiner, 2006. "Public-Private Partnerships and Prices: Evidence from Water Distribution in France," Review of Industrial Organization, Springer, vol. 29(1), pages 149-169, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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