The Impact of Trade Unions on Incentives to Deter Entry
AbstractIn this article I illustrate the impact of trade unions on strategic product market behavior. I discuss entry deterrence through capital durability in a model developed by Eaton and Lipsey. In the presence of unions, sunk capital scares away potential entrants but can also raise workers' bargaining power. Firms have thus to trade off these two effects in making their capital decisions. I analyze the impact of potential entry and unions on capital durability and welfare, and I discuss briefly the influence of unions on strategic product-market behavior in general.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by The RAND Corporation in its journal RAND Journal of Economics.
Volume (Year): 19 (1988)
Issue (Month): 2 (Summer)
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Other versions of this item:
- Mathias Dewatripont, 1988. "The impact of trade unions on incentives to deter entry," ULB Institutional Repository 2013/9571, ULB -- Universite Libre de Bruxelles.
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- Edgar Preugschat, 2009. "Unionization Patterns and Firm Reallocation," 2009 Meeting Papers 1114, Society for Economic Dynamics.
- Bhaumik, Sumon K. & Gangopadhyay, Shubhashis & Krishnan, Shagun, 2006.
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IZA Discussion Papers
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- Rupayan Pal & Bibhas Saha, 2010. "Entry Threats and Inefficiency in â€˜Efficient Bargainingâ€™," Working Papers id:2833, eSocialSciences.
- Shingo Ishiguro & Laixun Zhao, 2004. "Raising Wages to Deter Entry under Unionization," Discussion Paper Series 155, Research Institute for Economics & Business Administration, Kobe University.
- Rupayan Pal & Bibhas Saha, 2010. "Entry Threats, and Inefficiency in Ã¢â‚¬ËœEfficient BargainingÃ¢â‚¬â„¢," Labor Economics Working Papers 23020, East Asian Bureau of Economic Research.
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