Uncovering Regulators' Social Welfare Weights
AbstractThis article describes a procedure that can be used to infer interesting information about the preferences of regulators from the pricing decisions they make. This is done by using an adaptation of the familiar Ramsey pricing model, which allows benefits derived from the consumption of different goods or derived by different consumers to carry different "social" weights. These weights are then exposed by inverting the first-order conditions of the constrained-maximum problem.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by The RAND Corporation in its journal RAND Journal of Economics.
Volume (Year): 15 (1984)
Issue (Month): 1 (Spring)
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- Carlos Perez Montes, 2012. "Regulatory bias in the price structure of local telephone services," Banco de Espaï¿½a Working Papers 1201, Banco de Espa�a.
- Valentini, Edilio, 2013. "Indirect Taxation, Public Pricing and Price Cap Regulation: a Synthesis," MPRA Paper 50889, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Ingo Vogelsang & Nishal Ramphal & Stephen Carroll & Nicholas Pace, 2007. "An economic analysis of consumer class actions in regulated industries," Journal of Regulatory Economics, Springer, vol. 32(1), pages 87-104, August.
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