On the Economics of Repeat Buying
AbstractThis article presents a theory of such phenomena as coupons valid for the next purchase of a good and high initiation fees for clubs. In these cases the price of a nondurable good is lowered for second-time buyers. We show here that this can be explained by a model in which a monopolist sells a good, and the buyers are uncertain of their taste for the product but not of the quality of the product per se.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by The RAND Corporation in its journal RAND Journal of Economics.
Volume (Year): 15 (1984)
Issue (Month): 3 (Autumn)
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Web page: http://www.rje.org
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- Hintermann, Beat & Lange, Andreas, 2013. "Learning abatement costs: On the dynamics of the optimal regulation of experience goods," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 66(3), pages 625-638.
- Bipasa Datta & Clive D Fraser, 2006. "The Company You Keep: Qualitative Uncertainty in Providing Club Goods," Discussion Papers, Department of Economics, University of York 06/21, Department of Economics, University of York.
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