This file is part of IDEAS, which uses RePEc data


[ Papers | Articles | Software | Books | Chapters | Authors | Institutions | JEL Classification | NEP reports | Search | New papers by email | Author registration | Rankings | Volunteers | FAQ | Blog | Help! ]

Competitive Bidding and the Production of Precontract Information

Author info | Abstract | Publisher info | Download info | Related research | Statistics
Author Info
Victor P. Goldberg
Abstract

This note is concerned with the effects of contractual complexity on the precontract bidding process. Competitive bidding is seen to be a heterogeneous class of devices for transmitting information between organizations. Even for rather simple contracts (e.g., Demsetz' license plates contract), the purchaser is seldom interested solely in price -- he is interested in acquiring and providing information as well. For complex contracts, such as a fifteen-year cable television franchise, the information problems tend to dominate. The implications of locating the liability for provision of precontract information on providers and on purchasers are considered.

Download Info
To download:

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. Information about this may be contained in the File-Format links below. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.

File URL: http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0361-915X%28197721%298%3A1%3C250%3ACBATPO%3E2.0.CO%3B2-P&origin=repec
File Format: application/pdf
File Function: full text
Download Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to JSTOR subscribers. See http://www.jstor.org for details.

As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version under "Related research" (further below) or search for a different version of it.

Publisher Info
Article provided by The RAND Corporation in its journal Bell Journal of Economics.

Volume (Year): 8 (1977)
Issue (Month): 1 (Spring)
Pages: 250-261
Download reference. The following formats are available: HTML (with abstract), plain text (with abstract), BibTeX, RIS (EndNote, RefMan, ProCite), ReDIF
Handle: RePEc:rje:bellje:v:8:y:1977:i:spring:p:250-261

Contact details of provider:
Web page: http://www.rje.org

Order Information:
Web: http://gemini.econ.umd.edu/cgi-bin/rje_online.cgi

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its listing, contact: ().

Related research
Keywords:

Other versions of this item:

Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)
  1. Gian Luigi Albano & Federico Dini & Roberto Zampino, 2008. "Bidding for Complex Projects: Evidence From the Acquisitions of IT Services," Working Papers 2008.86, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei. [Downloadable!]
  2. Greg Mason, 1978. "The Grain Handling and Transportation Commission," Canadian Public Policy, University of Toronto Press, vol. 4(2), pages 235-245, Spring. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  3. Radkevitch, U.L. & Heck, H.W.G.M. van & Koppius, O.R., 2008. "Choosing between Auctions and Negotiations in Online B2B Markets for IT Services: The Effect of Prior Relationships and Performance," Research Paper ERS-2008-004-LIS Revision, Erasmus Research Institute of Management (ERIM), ERIM is the joint research institute of the Rotterdam School of Management, Erasmus University and the Erasmus School of Economics (ESE) at Erasmus Uni. [Downloadable!]
  4. Gil, Ricard, 2006. "Renegotiation, Learning and Relational Contracting," CEI Working Paper Series 2005-14, Center for Economic Institutions, Institute of Economic Research, Hitotsubashi University. [Downloadable!]
  5. Howard Smith & John Thanassoulis, 2009. "Upstream Competition and Downstream Buyer Power," Economics Series Working Papers 420, University of Oxford, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  6. Lisa J. Cameron, 2000. "Limiting Buyer Discretion: Effects on Performance and Price in Long-Term Contracts," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 90(1), pages 265-281, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  7. William P. Rogerson, 1988. "Profit Regulation of Defense Contractors and Prizes for Innovation : Theory and Evidence," Discussion Papers 759, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science. [Downloadable!]
  8. Kenneth French & Robert McCormick, 1982. "Sunk Costs and Competitive Bidding," University of California at Los Angeles, Anderson Graduate School of Management 1232, Anderson Graduate School of Management, UCLA. [Downloadable!]
Statistics
Access and download statistics

Did you know? You can use IDEAS to provide links to papers and articles in your course syllabus.

This page was last updated on 2009-12-9.

This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Department of Economics, College of Liberal Arts and Sciences, University of Connecticut using RePEc data on a server sponsored by the Society for Economic Dynamics.