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The Economics of Sharing: A Transactions Costs Analysis of Contractual Choice in Farming

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  • Peter Murrell

Abstract

This article analyzes the reasons for the adoption of contracts in which factors receive a share of output as payment. Previous theories are unsatisfactory in that their assumptions and predictions are inconsistent with basic features of activities in which such contracts are used. A new explanation is offered based on the transactional problems of multiperiod contractual relationships. It is shown that share rents can solve transactional problems when fixed rents have high transactions costs and internal organization cannot be used because of monitoring problems.

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Bibliographic Info

Article provided by The RAND Corporation in its journal Bell Journal of Economics.

Volume (Year): 14 (1983)
Issue (Month): 1 (Spring)
Pages: 283-293

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Handle: RePEc:rje:bellje:v:14:y:1983:i:spring:p:283-293

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Cited by:
  1. James Roumasset, 2004. "Rural Institutions, Agricultural Development, and Pro-poor Economic Growth," Asian Journal of Agriculture and Development, Southeast Asian Regional Center for Graduate Study and Research in Agriculture, vol. 1(1), pages 61-82, June.
  2. Luis H. B. Braido, 2003. "Insurance and Incentives in Sharecropping," CESifo Working Paper Series 1098, CESifo Group Munich.
  3. Hurrelmann, Annette, 2002. "How to Approach a Market? A Theoretical Concept for Defining and Describing Land Markets," 2002 International Congress, August 28-31, 2002, Zaragoza, Spain 24887, European Association of Agricultural Economists.
  4. Pender, John L. & Fafchamps, Marcel, 2001. "Land lease markets and agricultural efficiency: theory and evidence from Ethiopia," EPTD discussion papers 81, International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI).
  5. Binswanger, Hans P. & Deininger, Klaus & Feder, Gershon, 1993. "Power, distortions, revolt, and reform in agricultural land relations," Policy Research Working Paper Series 1164, The World Bank.
  6. Roumasset, James A., 2006. "The Economics of Agricultural Development: What Have We Learned?," 2006 Annual Meeting, August 12-18, 2006, Queensland, Australia 25598, International Association of Agricultural Economists.
  7. Luis H.B. Braido, 2005. "Risk and Insurance in Sharecropping," Risk and Insurance 0508002, EconWPA.
  8. Carnaje, Gideon P., 2007. "Contractual Arrangements in Philippine Fisheries," Discussion Papers DP 2007-22, Philippine Institute for Development Studies.
  9. Lee J. Alston & Bernardo Mueller, 2010. "Property Rights, Land Conflict and Tenancy in Brazil," NBER Working Papers 15771, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  10. H. Peyton Young & Mary A. Burke, 2001. "Competition and Custom in Economic Contracts: A Case Study of Illinois Agriculture," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 91(3), pages 559-573, June.
  11. Sanjaya DeSilva, 2000. "Skills, Partnerships and Tenancy in Sri Lankan Rice Farms," Working Papers 819, Economic Growth Center, Yale University.

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