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Monopoly Power and Expense-Preference Behavior: Theory and Evidence to the Contrary

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  • Michael Smirlock
  • William Marshall

Abstract

The expense-preference theory of the firm implies that in noncompetitive product markets, managers hire labor beyond the profit-maximizing level. This theory has recently received empirical support from Edwards (1977) and Hannan and Mavinga (1980). In this article it is shown that for expense-preference behavior to exist, the effectiveness of the technology for conflict control between shareholders and managers must be related to market structure, which is a tenuous proposition. Further, once differences in monitoring costs due to variation in firm size are controlled for, the empirical evidence supports managerial profit-maximizing rather than expense-preference behavior.

Suggested Citation

  • Michael Smirlock & William Marshall, 1983. "Monopoly Power and Expense-Preference Behavior: Theory and Evidence to the Contrary," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 14(1), pages 166-178, Spring.
    • Handle: RePEc:rje:bellje:v:14:y:1983:i:spring:p:166-178
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    Cited by:

    1. Hasan, Iftekhar & Lozano-Vivas, Ana, 2002. "Organizational Form and Expense Preference: Spanish Experience," Bulletin of Economic Research, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 54(2), pages 135-150, April.
    2. Loretta J. Mester, 1989. "Owners versus managers: who controls the bank?," Business Review, Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia, issue May, pages 13-23.
    3. Mahmood Araï & Gérard Ballot & Ali Skalli, 1996. "Différentiels intersectoriels de salaire et caractéristiques des employeurs en France," Économie et Statistique, Programme National Persée, vol. 299(1), pages 37-58.
    4. Nickell, Stephen, 1999. "Product markets and labour markets1," Labour Economics, Elsevier, vol. 6(1), pages 1-20, March.
    5. Barros, Victor & Verga Matos, Pedro & Miranda Sarmento, Joaquim & Rino Vieira, Pedro, 2023. "High-tech firms: Dividend policy in a context of sustainability and technological change," Technological Forecasting and Social Change, Elsevier, vol. 190(C).
    6. Stephen D. Prowse, 1995. "Alternative methods of corporate control in commercial banks," Economic and Financial Policy Review, Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas, issue Q III, pages 24-36.
    7. Poltavets Ivan, 2005. "Productivity Differential and Competition: Can an Old Dog be Taught New Tricks?," EERC Working Paper Series 05-09e, EERC Research Network, Russia and CIS.
    8. Sirajo Aliyu & Rosylin Mohd Yusof, 2016. "Profitability and Cost Efficiency of Islamic Banks: A Panel Analysis of Some Selected Countries," International Journal of Economics and Financial Issues, Econjournals, vol. 6(4), pages 1736-1743.
    9. Gropper, Daniel M. & Hudson, Carl D., 2003. "A note on savings and loan ownership structure and expense preference: A re-examination," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 27(10), pages 2003-2014, October.
    10. Tiffany Hutcheson & Ian G. Sharpe, 1998. "Ownership Structure and Building Society Efficiency," Australian Journal of Management, Australian School of Business, vol. 23(2), pages 151-168, December.
    11. Manoj Pant & Manoranjan Pattanayak, 2010. "Corporate Governance, Competition and Firm Performance," Journal of Emerging Market Finance, Institute for Financial Management and Research, vol. 9(3), pages 347-381, December.
    12. Li‐Ying Huang & Yu‐Luen Ma & Nat Pope, 2012. "Foreign Ownership and Non‐Life Insurer Efficiency in the Japanese Marketplace," Risk Management and Insurance Review, American Risk and Insurance Association, vol. 15(1), pages 57-88, March.
    13. Matthew S. Goldberg & Thomas P. Frazier, 1994. "Employment and utilization of engineers among defense contractors," Naval Research Logistics (NRL), John Wiley & Sons, vol. 41(7), pages 853-874, December.
    14. Yamori, Nobuyoshi, 1998. "Bureaucrat-managers and corporate governance: expense-preference behaviors in Japanese financial institutions," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 61(3), pages 385-389, December.
    15. Stephen D. Prowse, 1995. "Alternative methods of corporate control in commercial banks," Working Papers 9507, Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas.
    16. Wang, David Han-Min, 2010. "Corporate investment, financing, and dividend policies in the high-tech industry," Journal of Business Research, Elsevier, vol. 63(5), pages 486-489, May.
    17. Neuberger, Doris, 1997. "Structure, Conduct and Performance in Banking Markets," Thuenen-Series of Applied Economic Theory 12, University of Rostock, Institute of Economics.
    18. Lee Mobley & W. David Bradford, 1997. "Behavioural differences among hospitals: it is ownership, or location?," Applied Economics, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 29(9), pages 1125-1138.

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