Advanced Search
MyIDEAS: Login to save this article or follow this journal

Consumer Information, Equilibrium Industry Price, and the Number of Sellers

Contents:

Author Info

  • Mark A. Satterthwaite
Registered author(s):

    Abstract

    Define a reputation good to be any product or service for which sellers' products are differentiated and consumers' search among sellers consists of a series of inquiries to relatives, friends, and associates for recommendations. Examples of reputation goods are personal legal services and primary medical care. The paper shows that if a monopolistically competitive industry sells a reputation good, then an increased number of sellers may perversely cause the industry's equilibrium price to rise. This result is based on maximizing behavior on both sides of the market: consumers are assumed to search rationally and sellers are assumed to profit maximize.

    Download Info

    If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
    File URL: http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0361-915X%28197923%2910%3A2%3C483%3ACIEIPA%3E2.0.CO%3B2-7&origin=repec
    File Function: full text
    Download Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to JSTOR subscribers. See http://www.jstor.org for details.

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version under "Related research" (further below) or search for a different version of it.

    Bibliographic Info

    Article provided by The RAND Corporation in its journal Bell Journal of Economics.

    Volume (Year): 10 (1979)
    Issue (Month): 2 (Autumn)
    Pages: 483-502

    as in new window
    Handle: RePEc:rje:bellje:v:10:y:1979:i:autumn:p:483-502

    Contact details of provider:
    Web page: http://www.rje.org

    Order Information:
    Web: https://editorialexpress.com/cgi-bin/rje_online.cgi

    Related research

    Keywords:

    References

    No references listed on IDEAS
    You can help add them by filling out this form.

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as in new window

    Cited by:
    1. Martin Gaynor & William B. Vogt, . "Antitrust and Competition in Health Care Markets," GSIA Working Papers 1999-E29, Carnegie Mellon University, Tepper School of Business.
    2. Daniel P. Kessler & Mark B. McClellan, 1999. "Is Hospital Competition Socially Wasteful?," NBER Working Papers 7266, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    3. Daniel Kessler & Mark McClellan, 1999. "Designing Hospital Antitrust Policy to Promote Social Welfare," NBER Working Papers 6897, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    4. Maia David & Alain-Désiré Nimubona & Bernard Sinclair-Desgagné, 2007. "Environmental Taxation and the Structure of the Eco-industry," Working Papers 2007/02, INRA, Economie Publique.
    5. Jonathan Gruber, 1992. "The Effect of Price Shopping in Medical Markets: Hospital Responses to PPOs in California," NBER Working Papers 4190, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    6. Chikako Yamauchi, 2009. "The Availability of Child Care Centers, Perceived Search Costs and Parental Life Satisfaction," CEPR Discussion Papers 620, Centre for Economic Policy Research, Research School of Economics, Australian National University.
    7. Hoff, Karla & Stiglitz, Joseph E., 1998. "Moneylenders and bankers: price-increasing subsidies in a monopolistically competitive market," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 55(2), pages 485-518, April.
    8. Chen, Yongmin & Zhang, Tianle, 2013. "Entry and Welfare in Search Markets," MPRA Paper 52241, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    9. Oksana Loginova, 2007. "Real and Virtual Competition," Working Papers 0715, Department of Economics, University of Missouri.
    10. Gál, Róbert Iván & Csaba, Iván, 1997. "A bőség zavara: tökéletlen fogyasztói információ és verseny a háziorvosi szolgáltatások piacán
      [The confusion of plenty: imperfect consumer information and competition on the market of
      ," Közgazdasági Szemle (Economic Review - monthly of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences), Közgazdasági Szemle Alapítvány (Economic Review Foundation), vol. 0(7), pages 673-686.
    11. Yongmin Chen & Michael H. Riordan, 2008. "Price-increasing competition," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 39(4), pages 1042-1058.
    12. Asubonteng Rivers, Patrick & Bae, Sejong, 1999. "Hospital competition in major U.S. metropolitan areas: An empirical evidence," Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics (formerly The Journal of Socio-Economics), Elsevier, vol. 28(5), pages 597-606.
    13. Wong, Herbert S., 1996. "Market structure and the role of consumer information in the physician services industry: An empirical test," Journal of Health Economics, Elsevier, vol. 15(2), pages 139-160, April.

    Lists

    This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:rje:bellje:v:10:y:1979:i:autumn:p:483-502. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: ().

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

    If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.