The Ownership Structure As A Corporate Governance Mechanism In Serbian Hotels
AbstractThis article analyses the development in Serbien tourism sector during the last decade. The article is focused on the ownership structure and company performance in the light of corporate governance theory and the actuel privatisation process. Previous research has proven that Serbien state is a poor and pasive owner, whereas private owners and amployees are more active and more interested in their company’s economic performance. This article shows that the transition to private ownership in the Serbian hotels sector has not been finished. Consequently, state-owned and investment funds remain important owners of Serbien hotels. The financial performance of hotel companies is below average in the economy and can be correlated with the current ownership structure. Since the current ownership structure has a negative impact on the hotel sector competitiveness, an ownership change is needed to boost the sector’s competitivensess and the competitivensess of Serbia as tourist destination.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by University of Tourism and Management, Skopje, Macedonia in its journal UTMS Journal of Economics.
Volume (Year): 1 (2010)
Issue (Month): 1 ()
ownership; structure; performance; hotel companies; Serbia;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- G32 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Financing Policy; Financial Risk and Risk Management; Capital and Ownership Structure; Value of Firms; Goodwill
- L83 - Industrial Organization - - Industry Studies: Services - - - Sports; Gambling; Restaurants; Recreation; Tourism
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