Capital Ownership and the Political Economy of Free Trade Agreements
AbstractThis article examines the political economy of free trade agreements. It assumes that, unlike labour, capital in two countries is owned and represented by the same lobby group. Using a Heckscher-Ohlin framework, factors affecting the likelihood of political parties and lobby groups supporting free trade agreements are investigated. The effects of free trade agreements on tariffs facing non-member countries are also examined.
Download InfoTo our knowledge, this item is not available for download. To find whether it is available, there are three options:
1. Check below under "Related research" whether another version of this item is available online.
2. Check on the provider's web page whether it is in fact available.
3. Perform a search for a similarly titled item that would be available.
Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Center for Economic Integration, Sejong University in its journal Journal of Economic Integration.
Volume (Year): 23 (2008)
Issue (Month): ()
Trade agreements; Endogenous trade policy;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- D70 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - General
- F10 - International Economics - - Trade - - - General
You can help add them by filling out this form.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Jong-Eun Lee).
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.