Globally Optimal R&D Subsidy Policy: an Economist’s View on the WTO Subsidy Agreement
AbstractWe provide economic backgrounds to the Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures under the World Trade Organization. Permitting R&D subsidy under Article 8 of the Agreement can be interpreted as an inefficient victory of an individual exporting country in the non-cooperative game, harnessing strategic relationship over a foreign rival firm into its domestic industrial policy. In addition, we show that the expiration of Article 8 can be understood as a result of the global optimum, where we maximize the sum of welfares over exporting and importing countries in the symmetric case with a linear demand.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Center for Economic Integration, Sejong University in its journal Journal of Economic Integration.
Volume (Year): 23 (2008)
Issue (Month): ()
Strategic Trade Policy; R&D subsidies; WTO;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- F10 - International Economics - - Trade - - - General
- F13 - International Economics - - Trade - - - Trade Policy; International Trade Organizations
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