Strategic Export Policy in the Presence of Subcontracting
Abstract
This paper examines the optimal export policies when ex ante negotiation over subcontract manufacturing occurs between two competing international-firms. It show that it could be optimal for the exporting country to adopt either a different or a parallel trade policy between the two exporting goods (the final product and the subcontracted product). However, a different trade policy that taxes the finalproduct export and subsidizes the subcontracted-product export is not ever optimal. When the exporting firm is a pure subcontractor, taxing the single export (subcontracted product) becomes the only optimal trade policy of the exporting country. Morever, the exporting country imposes a less aggressive trade policy in response given that the importing country inflicts a more aggressive trade policy.Download Info
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Bibliographic Info
Article provided by Center for Economic Integration, Sejong University in its journal Journal of Economic Integration.
Volume (Year): 22 (2007)
Issue (Month): ()
Pages: 973-994
Contact details of provider:
Web page: http://econo.sejong.ac.kr/
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Related research
Keywords: Subcontracting; International Trade; Nash Bargaining; Trade Policy;Find related papers by JEL classification:
- F13 - International Economics - - Trade - - - Trade Policy; International Trade Organizations
- L13 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
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