Advanced Search
MyIDEAS: Login to save this article or follow this journal

Système éducatif et bien-être social : faut-il subventionner l’éducation?

Contents:

Author Info

  • Barthélémy, Vincent

    (GREQAM)

Registered author(s):

    Abstract

    We deal with an OLG model in which human capital accumulation depends on two inputs: the personal training effort and the productivity of the public education system. The productivity of public education is represented by the teacher-pupil ratio, which partly depends on the percentage of teachers chosen by the government. Even if individuals also influence the teacher-pupil ratio through their training effort, each one taken individually disregards this effect. This last points entails a break between competitive equilibrium and optimum and thus justifies a public intervention necessary to compensate for this sub-optimality. We show that a subsidy to education together with intergenerational transfers are sufficient to restore the optimum in the competitive equilibrium. Finally, along the constant growth path, we show that the sign of the subsidy depends on the relative size of the two educational externalities. We specify the effect of main parameters on optimal variables in an example. Nous considérons un modèle à générations imbriquées dans lequel l’accumulation de capital humain dépend à la fois de l’effort d’éducation des individus et de la productivité du système public d’éducation. Ce dernier dépend notamment du pourcentage d’enseignants choisi par les pouvoirs publics. Même si chaque individu influence également le taux d’encadrement par son propre effort d’éducation qui modifie la taille des classes, chacun pris individuellement considère cet effet comme négligeable. Ceci introduit une rupture entre équilibre et optimum et rend nécessaire une intervention publique. Nous montrons qu’une subvention à l’éducation associée à des transferts intergénérationnels (deuxième théorème du bien-être) suffit à rétablir l’optimum dans l’équilibre concurrentiel. Le long du sentier de croissance à taux constant, le signe de la subvention dépend de l’ampleur relative des deux externalités d’éducation. Nous précisons l’influence des paramètres pertinents sur les variables optimales dans un exemple.

    Download Info

    If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
    File URL: http://id.erudit.org/iderudit/602335ar
    Download Restriction: no

    Bibliographic Info

    Article provided by Société Canadienne de Science Economique in its journal L'Actualité économique.

    Volume (Year): 76 (2000)
    Issue (Month): 4 (décembre)
    Pages: 521-541

    as in new window
    Handle: RePEc:ris:actuec:v:76:y:2000:i:4:p:521-541

    Contact details of provider:
    Email:
    Web page: http://www.scse.ca/
    More information through EDIRC

    Related research

    Keywords:

    References

    References listed on IDEAS
    Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
    as in new window
    1. Lucas, Robert Jr., 1988. "On the mechanics of economic development," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 22(1), pages 3-42, July.
    2. Glomm, Gerhard & Ravikumar, B, 1992. "Public versus Private Investment in Human Capital Endogenous Growth and Income Inequality," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 100(4), pages 818-34, August.
    3. Alan B. Krueger, 1999. "Experimental Estimates Of Education Production Functions," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 114(2), pages 497-532, May.
    4. Yoram Ben-Porath, 1967. "The Production of Human Capital and the Life Cycle of Earnings," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 75, pages 352.
    5. MARCHAND, M. & MICHEL, Ph. & PESTIEAU, P., 1990. "Optimal intergenerational transfers in a growth model with fertility and productivity changes," CORE Discussion Papers 1990059, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
    6. MARCHAND, Maurice & MICHEL, Philippe & PESTIEAU, Pierre, 1993. "Optimal intergenerational transfers in an endogenous growth model with fertility change," CORE Discussion Papers 1993011, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
    7. Mark Gradstein & Moshe Justman, 1996. "The political economy of mixed public and private schooling: A dynamic analysis," International Tax and Public Finance, Springer, vol. 3(3), pages 297-310, July.
    8. repec:fth:prinin:379 is not listed on IDEAS
    9. Azariadis, Costas & Drazen, Allan, 1990. "Threshold Externalities in Economic Development," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 105(2), pages 501-26, May.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Lists

    This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:ris:actuec:v:76:y:2000:i:4:p:521-541. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Bruce Shearer).

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

    If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.