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La efectividad en términos de desarrollo de las instituciones multilaterales bajo restricciones de acción colectiva

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  • Eduardo Wiesner Durán

    (Wiesner y Asociados)

Abstract

This paper suggests that the best way to evaluate and drive development policy is to understand the root causes that explain the political economy restrictions limiting the developmental effectiveness of multilateral and bilateral institutions. To mitigate the deleterious effects of collective action restrictions this paper recommends a two-pronged interdependent strategy: an enhanced use of ex ante evaluation in all interventions and through a more intensive application of the paper trail approach; and changes of constitutional rules or macro-institutional conditions which determine the decisions made in all institutions.

Suggested Citation

  • Eduardo Wiesner Durán, 2007. "La efectividad en términos de desarrollo de las instituciones multilaterales bajo restricciones de acción colectiva," Revista de Economía Institucional, Universidad Externado de Colombia - Facultad de Economía, vol. 9(17), pages 23-42, July-Dece.
    • Handle: RePEc:rei:ecoins:v:9:y:2007:i:17:p:23-42
    as

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    File URL: http://www.uexternado.edu.co/facecono/ecoinstitucional/workingpapers/ewiesner17.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    economic development; multilateral institutions; collective action restrictions;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • I38 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Welfare, Well-Being, and Poverty - - - Government Programs; Provision and Effects of Welfare Programs
    • O20 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Development Planning and Policy - - - General

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