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Thomas C. Schelling: la paradoja de un economista errante

Author

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  • Boris Salazar

    (Universidad del Valle)

Abstract

This article explains two enigmas related to the scientific career of Thomas C. Schelling, Nobel Price in Economics 2005: How to explain his capacity to always produce new ideas? Why have his multiple pioneer ideas had more impact on other social sciences and not on economics? The paper proposes three hypotheses: the minor impact of the acquired knowledge of his theoretical work, a heuristic that always privileged the relationship between unpublished facts and unusual angles, and the creation of a spontaneous knowledge network that covered different disciplines dedicated to social interaction.

Suggested Citation

  • Boris Salazar, 2007. "Thomas C. Schelling: la paradoja de un economista errante," Revista de Economía Institucional, Universidad Externado de Colombia - Facultad de Economía, vol. 9(17), pages 131-152, July-Dece.
    • Handle: RePEc:rei:ecoins:v:9:y:2007:i:17:p:131-152
    as

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    File URL: http://www.uexternado.edu.co/facecono/ecoinstitucional/workingpapers/bsalazar17.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Faruk Gul & Wolfgang Pesendorfer, 2005. "The Case for Mindless Economics," Levine's Working Paper Archive 784828000000000581, David K. Levine.
    2. Daniel B. Klein & Tyler Cowen & Timur Kuran, 2005. "Salute to Schelling: Keeping It Human," Econ Journal Watch, Econ Journal Watch, vol. 2(1), pages 159-164, April.
    3. Mehta, Judith & Starmer, Chris & Sugden, Robert, 1994. "The Nature of Salience: An Experimental Investigation of Pure Coordination Games," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 84(3), pages 658-673, June.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

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    Cited by:

    1. Julián Arévalo, editor., 2020. "Negociación y cooperación : teoría y experiencias en resolución de conflictos," Books, Universidad Externado de Colombia, Facultad de Economía, number 81, August.
    2. Jorge Iván González, 2016. "Sentimientos y racionalidad en economía," Books, Universidad Externado de Colombia, Facultad de Economía, edition 1, number 75, August.
    3. Luis Alejandro Palacio Garcia & Brayan Snehider Díaz, 2022. "Comunicación, jugadas estratégicas y compromiso: un análisis desde la economía experimental," Apuntes del Cenes, Universidad Pedagógica y Tecnológica de Colombia, vol. 41(73), pages 17-42, February.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    focal points; heuristic; theory of games; social dynamic; neural circuits;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • B31 - Schools of Economic Thought and Methodology - - History of Economic Thought: Individuals - - - Individuals
    • B41 - Schools of Economic Thought and Methodology - - Economic Methodology - - - Economic Methodology
    • D83 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief; Unawareness

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