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El poder de voto en el Consejo Nacional de Seguridad Social en Salud

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  • Sandra Milena Rodríguez A.

    ()
    (Universidad del Norte)

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    Abstract

    This paper presents a theoretical conceptualization of Colombia’s National Council of Health Social Security (CNSSS). Using a simple framework of theory of games, it analyzes the voting power of its members, and estimates the indexes of Banzhaf, Shapley-Shubik and Coleman. It shows that the Council’s decisions respond to a false consensus that reveals the interests of particular agents. It concludes that power indexes are sensitive to the election of the majority approval quota and that the proportion of votes does not clearly show the Council members’ power.

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    File URL: http://www.uexternado.edu.co/facecono/ecoinstitucional/workingpapers/srodriguez16.pdf
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    Bibliographic Info

    Article provided by Universidad Externado de Colombia - Facultad de Economía in its journal Revista de Economía Institucional.

    Volume (Year): 9 (2007)
    Issue (Month): 16 (January-June)
    Pages: 223-253

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    Handle: RePEc:rei:ecoins:v:9:y:2007:i:16:p:223-253

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    Related research

    Keywords: agency relationships; power index; coalition; regulation;

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    1. Alberto Alesina, 2000. "Institutional Reforms in Colombia," WORKING PAPERS SERIES. DOCUMENTOS DE TRABAJO 002887, FEDESARROLLO.
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