Advanced Search
MyIDEAS: Login to save this article or follow this journal

Hurwicz y el juez de última instancia

Contents:

Author Info

  • Jorge Iván González

    ()
    (Universidad Nacional de Colombia)

Registered author(s):

    Abstract

    When receiving the Nobel Prize, Hurwicz took up the question “who is watching the guards?” and considered two approaches. One pessimistic, inspired by Juvenal, which leads to an infinite sequence of guards, and one idealistic, derived from the Platonic dialogues. The guard cannot get drunk, and if he does, he should resign. Although this closure of first instance does not happen in the real world, neither does Juvenal’s pessimism make sense. Society always finds a reasonable closure instance, but this solution is suboptimal and is plagued with impurities and illegalities. The leading strategy may be part of a set of illegal alternatives. Implementation is successful if the equilibrium corresponds to the legislator’s purposes. Every implementation can be improved and it is never entirely successful. Implementation mechanisms determine how the social welfare function is reached, which affects at the same time the private property prices and the consumption structure, so the market configuration depends on the kind of implementation and how the close of the last instance is made.

    Download Info

    If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
    File URL: http://www.uexternado.edu.co/facecono/ecoinstitucional/workingpapers/jgonzalez19.pdf
    Download Restriction: no

    Bibliographic Info

    Article provided by Universidad Externado de Colombia - Facultad de Economía in its journal Revista de Economía Institucional.

    Volume (Year): 10 (2008)
    Issue (Month): 19 (July-December)
    Pages: 115-129

    as in new window
    Handle: RePEc:rei:ecoins:v:10:y:2008:i:19:p:115-129

    Contact details of provider:
    Postal: Cra. 1 No. 12-68 Casa de las Mandolinas
    Phone: (571) 2826066 Ext. 1307
    Fax: (571) 2826066 Ext. 1304
    Email:
    Web page: http://www.economiainstitucional.com
    More information through EDIRC

    Related research

    Keywords: social welfare function; human relations; suboptimal equilibrium;

    Find related papers by JEL classification:

    References

    References listed on IDEAS
    Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
    as in new window
    1. Robert J. Aumann, 2006. "War and Peace," Levine's Bibliography 321307000000000332, UCLA Department of Economics.
    2. Theodore W. Schultz, 1962. "Reflections on Investment in Man," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 70, pages 1.
    3. Nash, John, 1950. "The Bargaining Problem," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 18(2), pages 155-162, April.
    4. Arrow, Kenneth J, 1986. "Rationality of Self and Others in an Economic System," The Journal of Business, University of Chicago Press, vol. 59(4), pages S385-99, October.
    5. Hurwicz, Leonid, 1973. "The Design of Mechanisms for Resource Allocation," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 63(2), pages 1-30, May.
    6. Hurwicz, Leonid, 2007. "But Who Will Guard the Guardians?," Nobel Prize in Economics documents 2007-3, Nobel Prize Committee.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Lists

    This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:rei:ecoins:v:10:y:2008:i:19:p:115-129. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Paola Rodríguez).

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

    If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.