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On the Enforcement of Cooperative Environmental Policies

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Author Info
Stephane Pallage (UQAM)

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Abstract

This paper investigates the sustainability of Pareto optimal policies for the replenishment of renewable resources shared by two countries with asymmetrical wealth. It does so within a two-country neo-classical growth model with externality. In absence of commitment, it identifies simple self-enforcing mechanisms that implement social optima for a typical international resource (clean air) and a parameterization of the model to the United States and a country five times poorer. Such mechanisms are trigger strategies involving transfers of wealth between countries and threats of economic isolation in case of defection. Necessary transfers can represent up to 2.6% of US wealth. (Copyright: Elsevier)

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File URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1006/redy.1999.0076
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Publisher Info
Article provided by Elsevier for the Society for Economic Dynamics in its journal Review of Economic Dynamics.

Volume (Year): 3 (2000)
Issue (Month): 3 (July)
Pages: 572-596
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Handle: RePEc:red:issued:v:3:y:2000:i:3:p:572-596

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Related research
Keywords: commitment; sustainable optima; dynamic game; renewable resource; trigger strategy; pollution; transfers;

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Find related papers by JEL classification:
Q20 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Renewable Resources and Conservation - - - General
C73 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games
C68 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Mathematical Methods and Programming - - - Computable General Equilibrium Models

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Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

  1. Stephane Pallage & Christian Zimmermann, 2000. "Buying Out Child Labor?," Cahiers de recherche CREFE / CREFE Working Papers 123, CREFE, Université du Québec à Montréal. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
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