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Optimal Personal Bankruptcy Design under Moral Hazard

Author

Listed:
  • Borys Grochulski

    (Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond)

Abstract

In this paper, we develop a normative theory of unsecured consumer credit and personal bankruptcy based on the optimal trade-off between incentives and insurance. First, in order to characterize this trade-off, we solve a dynamic moral hazard problem in which agents' private effort decisions influence the life-cycle profiles of their earnings. We then show how the optimal allocation of individual effort and consumption can be implemented in a market equilibrium in which (i) agents and intermediaries repeatedly trade in secured and unsecured debt instruments, and (ii) agents obtain (restricted) discharge of their unsecured debts in bankruptcy. The structure of this equilibrium and the associated restrictions on debt discharge closely match the main qualitative features of personal credit markets and bankruptcy law that actually exist in the United States. (Copyright: Elsevier)

Suggested Citation

  • Borys Grochulski, 2010. "Optimal Personal Bankruptcy Design under Moral Hazard," Review of Economic Dynamics, Elsevier for the Society for Economic Dynamics, vol. 13(2), pages 350-378, April.
    • Handle: RePEc:red:issued:08-132
    DOI: 10.1016/j.red.2009.06.004
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Stefania Albanesi & Christopher Sleet, 2006. "Dynamic Optimal Taxation with Private Information," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 73(1), pages 1-30.
    2. Timothy J. Kehoe & David K. Levine, 2008. "Bankruptcy and Collateral in Debt Constrained Markets," Chapters, in: Roger E.A. Farmer (ed.), Macroeconomics in the Small and the Large, chapter 5, Edward Elgar Publishing.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Gordon, Grey, 2017. "Optimal bankruptcy code: A fresh start for some," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 85(C), pages 123-149.
    2. Albanesi, Stefania & Nosal, Jaromir, 2015. "Insolvency After the 2005 Bankruptcy Reform," CEPR Discussion Papers 10533, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    3. Borghan Nezami Narajabad, 2012. "Information Technology and the Rise of Household Bankruptcy," Review of Economic Dynamics, Elsevier for the Society for Economic Dynamics, vol. 15(4), pages 526-550, October.
    4. Carlos Hatchondo, Juan & Martinez, Leonardo & Sánchez, Juan M., 2015. "Mortgage defaults," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 76(C), pages 173-190.
      • Juan Carlos Hatchondo & Leonardo Martinez & Juan M. Sanchez, 2011. "Mortgage defaults," Working Paper 11-05, Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond.
      • Juan Carlos Hatchondo & Leonardo Martinez & Juan M. Sanchez, 2011. "Mortgage defaults," Working Papers 2011-019, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis.
      • Mr. Leonardo Martinez & Juan Carlos Hatchondo & Mr. Juan M. Sanchez, 2012. "Mortgage Defaults," IMF Working Papers 2012/026, International Monetary Fund.
      • Juan Carlos Hatchondo & Leonardo Martinez & Juan M. Sanchez, 2015. "Mortgage Defaults," CAEPR Working Papers 2015-011, Center for Applied Economics and Policy Research, Department of Economics, Indiana University Bloomington.
    5. Igor Livshits, 2015. "Recent Developments In Consumer Credit And Default Literature," Journal of Economic Surveys, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 29(4), pages 594-613, September.
    6. Kartik B. Athreya & Xuan S. Tam & Eric Young, 2012. "Debt default and the insurance of labor income risks," Economic Quarterly, Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond, vol. 98(4Q), pages 255-307.
    7. Gordon, Grey, 2017. "Optimal bankruptcy code: A fresh start for some," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 85(C), pages 123-149.
    8. Borys Grochulski, 2010. "On the optimality of Ramsey taxes in Mirless economies," Working Paper 10-14, Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond.
    9. Xie, Jiaping & Wei, Lihong & Zhu, Weijun & Zhang, Weisi, 2021. "Platform supply chain pricing and financing: Who benefits from e-commerce consumer credit?," International Journal of Production Economics, Elsevier, vol. 242(C).
    10. Ben‐jiang Ma & Jing‐yu Ye & Geng Liu & Yuan‐ji Huang, 2020. "Adverse selection, limited compensation, and the design of environmental liability insurance contract in the case of enterprise bankruptcy," Managerial and Decision Economics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 41(7), pages 1327-1337, October.
    11. Lihong Wei & Jiaping Xie & Weijun Zhu & Qinglin Li, 2023. "Pricing of platform service supply chain with dual credit: Can you have the cake and eat it?," Annals of Operations Research, Springer, vol. 321(1), pages 589-661, February.
    12. Borys Grochulski & Yuzhe Zhang, 2014. "Optimal Institutions in Economies with Private Information: Exclusive Contracts, Taxes, and Bankruptcy Law," Economic Quarterly, Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond, issue 4Q, pages 353-385.
    13. Lang Yang, 2019. "The impact of state intervention and bankruptcy authorization laws on local government deficits," Economics of Governance, Springer, vol. 20(4), pages 305-328, December.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Bankruptcy; Unsecured credit; Moral hazard;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D86 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Economics of Contract Law
    • G18 - Financial Economics - - General Financial Markets - - - Government Policy and Regulation
    • K35 - Law and Economics - - Other Substantive Areas of Law - - - Personal Bankruptcy Law

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