A Games Theory Percption On Interstate Cooperation: Trade Incentives In The Black Sea Region And The Implications For Romania
Abstract
The international economic and political environment is constantly influenced by a wide and dynamic set of factors which constrain and preoccupy policymakers. The various interdependencies that potentially exist between certain business activities and state decisions are difficult to assess in the complexity that characterizes the real world. Thus, great efforts have been made in trying to create models that reduce the variety and dynamic of certain observations in order to grasp the evolutions and connections between individual factors. The relation that exists between the activity of trade and the probability of engaging in a conflicting situation has long been addressed and accepted as consistent, though sometimes with paradoxical outcomes. This article follows these previous notions and by using games theory principles and methods it illustrates the situation existing in the Black Sea region by trying to create a model or, in this case a game, that identifies the possible outcomes in relation to certain economic incentives.Download Info
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Article provided by Romanian-American University in its journal Journal of Information Systems and Operations Management.
Volume (Year): 5 (2011)
Issue (Month): 2 (December)
Pages: 327-247
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Keywords: games theory; economic incentives; interstate conflict; static game; complete information game;References
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