Financing Regions and Local Governments: Problems and Perspectives
AbstractThis paper deals with how the reform regulating fiscal federalism in Italy (L. 42/2009) addresses three problems. First, how to finance additional sub-central competencies with local taxes, especially when they involve the provision of minimum or essential levels of service (e.g. health). Second, how to solve the trade-off between the need for greater efficiency and the need to equalise the lower endowment of the poorer regions. Third, whether local governments should have a direct relationship with the central government or whether the regions may successfully fund and equalise the fiscal capacity of local governments within their territories.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Associazione Rossi Doria in its journal QA.
Volume (Year): (2011)
Issue (Month): 1 (March)
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More information through EDIRC
Fiscal federalism; Equalisation; Minimum standards;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- H71 - Public Economics - - State and Local Government; Intergovernmental Relations - - - State and Local Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue
- H72 - Public Economics - - State and Local Government; Intergovernmental Relations - - - State and Local Budget and Expenditures
- H73 - Public Economics - - State and Local Government; Intergovernmental Relations - - - Interjurisdictional Differentials and Their Effects
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