Fiscal Policies for Italy’s Fishing Industry: Theoretical and Empirical Aspects
AbstractThe solution to the problem of over-fishing offered by catch-effort models is a reduction in capital invested. Fishery policy, both European and Italian, is constructed entirely on the basis of this idea. Applying the same theoretical apparatus, we show that fiscal policies can be used in order to achieve the same goal. Furthermore, evaluation of the tax burden for Italian sea-fishing firms raises various points on the basis of which present fishery policy is found wanting with respect to its own theoretical apparatus (catch-effort models). Subsidies for definitive withdrawal and equipment renewal are opportune but economic problems regarding the efficiency of equipment will emerge if fiscal pressure is too high: firms will tend to withdraw from the market rather than renew their equipment. Since the Italian fishing sector comes under strong fiscal pressure we conclude that taxes should be effectively reduced and co-ordination with structural aid improved.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Associazione Rossi Doria in its journal QA.
Volume (Year): (2002)
Issue (Month): 1 (May)
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More information through EDIRC
Evaluation; Fiscal Charging; Fisheries; Incentives; Subsidies;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- D20 - Microeconomics - - Production and Organizations - - - General
- E62 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Macroeconomic Policy, Macroeconomic Aspects of Public Finance, and General Outlook - - - Fiscal Policy
- E65 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Macroeconomic Policy, Macroeconomic Aspects of Public Finance, and General Outlook - - - Studies of Particular Policy Episodes
- H32 - Public Economics - - Fiscal Policies and Behavior of Economic Agents - - - Firm
- Q22 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Renewable Resources and Conservation - - - Fishery
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