IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/rai/mamere/1861-9908_mrev_2004_02_backes-gellner.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Personnel Economics: An Economic Approach to Human Resource Management

Author

Listed:
  • Uschi Backes-Gellner

    (Zurich University, Institute of Business and Personnel Economics)

Abstract

The theoretical idea of personnel economics is to apply simple economic principles to the field of human resources management. Personnel economics as a research field has grown rapidly since the first text book on ?Personnel Economics? was published in 1998. The development is driven by new theoretical insights based on institutional and behavioural economics and new empirical methods and data sets. Those new theoretical insights are very fruitful to analyze reasons and consequences of various human resource management practices, to understand what actually drives and motivates employees, and what causes organisations to be successful or to fail. With the new data sets and econometric methods the theories that have been laid out in personnel economics either many years ago or very recently can now be tested thoroughly. And the evidence produced by the new data and methods is strongly supportive, which is not only reassuring for researchers, but it also suggests that practitioners can actually rely on the ideas because they are born out in the data. So, personnel economics is not only a vivid research field, but also of great value for human resource managers, particularly for those taking strategic HR decisions. The fruitfulness of personnel economics is demonstrated with four examples: training strategies of companies, recruiting in tight labour markets, career incentives, team size and effort, and entrepreneurial signalling towards employees and creditors.

Suggested Citation

  • Uschi Backes-Gellner, 2004. "Personnel Economics: An Economic Approach to Human Resource Management," management revue. Socio-economic Studies, Rainer Hampp Verlag, vol. 15(2), pages 215-227.
    • Handle: RePEc:rai:mamere:1861-9908_mrev_2004_02_backes-gellner
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://www.hampp-verlag.de/hampp_e-journals_mrev.htm#204
    Download Restriction: no
    ---><---

    Other versions of this item:

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Jonathan Levin & Steven Tadelis, 2005. "Profit Sharing and the Role of Professional Partnerships," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 120(1), pages 131-171.
    2. Sharon M. Oster & Daniel S. Hamermesh, 1998. "Aging And Productivity Among Economists," The Review of Economics and Statistics, MIT Press, vol. 80(1), pages 154-156, February.
    3. Uschi Backes-Gellner & Arndt Werner, 2003. "Entrepreneurial Signaling: Success Factors for Innovative Start-Ups," Working Papers 0055, University of Zurich, Institute for Strategy and Business Economics (ISU), revised Mar 2004.
    4. Anitesh Barua & C.-H. Sophie Lee & Andrew B. Whinston, 1995. "Incentives and Computing Systems for Team-Based Organizations," Organization Science, INFORMS, vol. 6(4), pages 487-504, August.
    5. Barron, John M & Gjerde, Kathy Paulson, 1997. "Peer Pressure in an Agency Relationship," Journal of Labor Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 15(2), pages 234-254, April.
    6. Jensen, Michael C. & Meckling, William H., 1976. "Theory of the firm: Managerial behavior, agency costs and ownership structure," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 3(4), pages 305-360, October.
    7. Coupé, Tom & Smeets, Valerie & Warzynski, Frederic, 2003. "Incentives in Economic Departments: Testing Tournaments?," Working Papers 03-25, University of Aarhus, Aarhus School of Business, Department of Economics.
    8. David Austen-Smith, 2002. "Peer Pressure and Job Market Signaling," Discussion Papers 1352, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
    9. Brent Boning & Casey Ichniowski & Kathryn Shaw, 2007. "Opportunity Counts: Teams and the Effectiveness of Production Incentives," Journal of Labor Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 25(4), pages 613-650.
    10. Armendariz de Aghion, Beatriz, 1999. "On the design of a credit agreement with peer monitoring," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 60(1), pages 79-104, October.
    11. Buchmueller, Thomas C. & Dominitz, Jeff & Lee Hansen, W., 1999. "Graduate training and the early career productivity of Ph.D. economists," Economics of Education Review, Elsevier, vol. 18(1), pages 65-77, February.
    12. Casey Ichniowski & Kathryn Shaw, 2003. "Beyond Incentive Pay: Insiders' Estimates of the Value of Complementary Human Resource Management Practices," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 17(1), pages 155-180, Winter.
    13. Kandel, Eugene & Lazear, Edward P, 1992. "Peer Pressure and Partnerships," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 100(4), pages 801-817, August.
    14. Andy Green & Hilary Steedman, 1997. "Into The 21st Century: An Assessment Of British Skill Profiles And Prospects," CEP Reports 06, Centre for Economic Performance, LSE.
    15. S.J. Prais, 1981. "Vocational Qualifications of the Labour Force in Britain and Germany," National Institute Economic Review, National Institute of Economic and Social Research, vol. 98(1), pages 47-59, November.
    16. Holzer, Harry J, 1994. "Job Vacancy Rates in the Firm: An Empirical Analysis," Economica, London School of Economics and Political Science, vol. 61(241), pages 17-36, February.
    17. Finegold, David & Soskice, David, 1988. "The Failure of Training in Britain: Analysis and Prescription," Oxford Review of Economic Policy, Oxford University Press and Oxford Review of Economic Policy Limited, vol. 4(3), pages 21-53, Autumn.
    18. McDowell, John M, 1982. "Obsolescence of Knowledge and Career Publication Profiles: Some Evidence of Differences among Fields in Costs of Interrupted Careers," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 72(4), pages 752-768, September.
    19. Michael Spence, 1973. "Job Market Signaling," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 87(3), pages 355-374.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Alexander Dilger, 2011. "Personnel Economics: Strengths, Weaknesses and Its Place in Human Resource Management," management revue - Socio-Economic Studies, Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft mbH & Co. KG, vol. 22(4), pages 331-343.

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Edward P. Lazear, 1995. "Personnel Economics," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262121883, December.
    2. Ann Bartel & Brianna Cardiff-Hicks & Kathryn Shaw, 2013. "Compensation Matters: Incentives for Multitasking in a Law Firm," NBER Working Papers 19412, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    3. Edward P. Lazear & Paul Oyer, 2012. "Personnel Economics [The Handbook of Organizational Economics]," Introductory Chapters,, Princeton University Press.
    4. Román, Francisco J., 2009. "An analysis of changes to a team-based incentive plan and its effects on productivity, product quality, and absenteeism," Accounting, Organizations and Society, Elsevier, vol. 34(5), pages 589-618, July.
    5. SeEun Jung & Radu Vranceanu, 2017. "Gender Interaction in Teams: Experimental Evidence on Performance and Punishment Behavior," Korean Economic Review, Korean Economic Association, vol. 33, pages 95-126.
    6. Adriani, Fabrizio & Sonderegger, Silvia, 2019. "A theory of esteem based peer pressure," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 115(C), pages 314-335.
    7. Michael Waldman, 2012. "Theory and Evidence in Internal LaborMarkets [The Handbook of Organizational Economics]," Introductory Chapters,, Princeton University Press.
    8. Arando, Saioa & Gago, Monica & Jones, Derek C. & Kato, Takao, 2011. "Efficiency in Employee-Owned Enterprises: An Econometric Case Study of Mondragon," IZA Discussion Papers 5711, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).
    9. Sandra E. Black & Lisa M. Lynch, 2005. "Measuring Organizational Capital in the New Economy," NBER Chapters, in: Measuring Capital in the New Economy, pages 205-236, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    10. David Marsden & Richard Belfield, 2010. "Institutions and the Management of Human Resources: Incentive Pay Systems in France and Great Britain," British Journal of Industrial Relations, London School of Economics, vol. 48(2), pages 235-283, June.
    11. Burdin, Gabriel & Kato, Takao, 2021. "Complementarity in Employee Participation Systems: International Evidence," IZA Discussion Papers 14694, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).
    12. Tat Y. Chan & Jia Li & Lamar Pierce, 2014. "Compensation and Peer Effects in Competing Sales Teams," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 60(8), pages 1965-1984, August.
    13. Richard B. Freeman & Douglas L. Kruse & Joseph R. Blasi, 2010. "Worker Responses to Shirking under Shared Capitalism," NBER Chapters, in: Shared Capitalism at Work: Employee Ownership, Profit and Gain Sharing, and Broad-based Stock Options, pages 77-103, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    14. Neckermann, Susanne & Cueni, Reto & Frey, Bruno S., 2014. "Awards at work," Labour Economics, Elsevier, vol. 31(C), pages 205-217.
    15. Jan-Philipp Ahrens & Andrea Calabrò & Jolien Huybrechts & Michael Woywode, 2019. "The Enigma of the Family Successor–Firm Performance Relationship: A Methodological Reflection and Reconciliation Attempt," Entrepreneurship Theory and Practice, , vol. 43(3), pages 437-474, May.
    16. Lisa Lynch, 2007. "The Adoption and Diffusion of Organizational Innovation: Evidence for the U.S. Economy," Working Papers 07-18, Center for Economic Studies, U.S. Census Bureau.
    17. Seeun Jung & Radu Vranceanu, 2015. "Gender Interaction in Teams: Experimental Evidence on Performance and Punishment Behavior," PSE Working Papers hal-01171161, HAL.
    18. Brice Corgnet & Roberto Hernán-González & Stephen Rassenti, 2011. "Real Effort, Real Leisure and Real-time Supervision: Incentives and Peer Pressure in Virtual Organizations," Working Papers 11-05, Chapman University, Economic Science Institute.
    19. Bernd J. Frick & Ute Goetzen & Robert Simmons, 2013. "The Hidden Costs of High-Performance Work Practices: Evidence from a Large German Steel Company," ILR Review, Cornell University, ILR School, vol. 66(1), pages 198-224, January.
    20. Rupert Sausgruber, 2005. "Testing for Team Spirit - An Experimental Study," Experimental 0508001, University Library of Munich, Germany.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Personnel Economics; Strategic Human Resource Management; Training Strategies; Hiring; Career Incentives; Effort in Teams; Entrepreneurial Signalling;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • F23 - International Economics - - International Factor Movements and International Business - - - Multinational Firms; International Business
    • J53 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Labor-Management Relations, Trade Unions, and Collective Bargaining - - - Labor-Management Relations; Industrial Jurisprudence
    • M10 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting; Personnel Economics - - Business Administration - - - General

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:rai:mamere:1861-9908_mrev_2004_02_backes-gellner. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Rainer Hampp (email available below). General contact details of provider: http://www.hampp-verlag.de/ .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.