This file is part of IDEAS, which uses RePEc data


[ Papers | Articles | Software | Books | Chapters | Authors | Institutions | JEL Classification | NEP reports | Search | New papers by email | Author registration | Rankings | Volunteers | FAQ | Blog | Help! ]

Programmes agri-environnementaux en présence d’effets de seuil

Author info | Abstract | Publisher info | Download info | Related research | Statistics
Author Info
Pierre Dupraz () (Unité d’économie et sociologie rurales (ESR),INRA,4 allée Adolphe Bobierre,CS61103,35011 Rennes cedex)
Karine Latouche (Laboratoire d’études et de recherches en économie, INRA, rue de la Géraudière, B.P. 71627, 44316 Nantes cedex 03)
Nadine Turpin (UMR Métafort, Cemagref, 24 avenue des Landais, 63172 Aubière cedex)

Additional information is available for the following registered author(s):

Abstract

L’objectif de ce papier est de proposer des procédures d’élaboration et de mise en œuvre des programmes agri-environnementaux pour assurer leur efficacité environnementale et sociale, lorsque les processus biophysiques en jeu sont caractérisés par des effets de seuils. La régulation publique est confrontée à deux problèmes bien distincts : d’une part, les asymétries d’information relevant classiquement de la théorie des contrats et des solutions qu’elle préconise et, d’autre part, une incertitude que partagent régulateur et agents sur la relation entre pratiques agricoles et état de l’environnement. Ces deux difficultés se cumulent fréquemment dans les programmes agrienvironnementaux et peuvent conduire, en présence d’effets de seuils, à l’absence d’effet environnemental et au découragement des agriculteurs. À partir d’un modèle micro-économique et de l’analyse approfondie d’un exemple, cette contribution montre qu’une gestion pérenne et évolutive des programmes permet une capitalisation locale des compétences et un gain d’efficacité. Cette gestion vise à tirer parti d’économies d’échelle et d’apprentissage tant managériales que techniques, à condition de spécifier des contrats dont la réalisation contribue à préciser et à quantifier des effets de seuil souvent mal connus et localement spécifiques. Dans certains cas, l’instauration par le régulateur d’un taux minimal de contractualisation dans une zone donnée constitue une information conduisant à accroître la probabilité de participation des agriculteurs.

Download Info
To download:

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. Information about this may be contained in the File-Format links below. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.

File URL: http://www.inra.fr/esr/publications/cahiers/pdf/dupraz.pdf?PHPSESSID=746f314b380b125ca19a995592c4723c
File Format: application/pdf
File Function:
Download Restriction: no

Publisher Info
Article provided by INRA Department of Economics in its journal Cahiers d'Economie et Sociologie Rurales.

Volume (Year): 82-83 (2007)
Issue (Month): ()
Pages: 5-32
Download reference. The following formats are available: HTML (with abstract), plain text (with abstract), BibTeX, RIS (EndNote, RefMan, ProCite), ReDIF
Handle: RePEc:rae:jouces:v:82-83:y:2007:i::p:5-32

Contact details of provider:
Postal: Rue Adolphe Bobierre, CS 61103 - 35011 Rennes cedex
Phone: (33) 02 23 48 53 82
Fax: (33) 02 23 48 53 80
Web page: http://www.raestud.eu/accueil_en.php
More information through EDIRC

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its listing, contact: (Anne Chauvel).

Related research
Keywords: threshold effect; agri-environmental policy;

Other versions of this item:

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
  1. Toman, Michael & Withagen, Cees, 1998. "Accumulative Pollution, "Clean Technology," and Policy Design," Discussion Papers dp-98-43, Resources For the Future. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  2. Charles Perrings & David Pearce, 1994. "Threshold effects and incentives for the conservation of biodiversity," Environmental & Resource Economics, European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 4(1), pages 13-28, February. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  3. Tapan Mitra & Santanu Roy, 2006. "Optimal exploitation of renewable resources under uncertainty and the extinction of species," Economic Theory, Springer, vol. 28(1), pages 1-23, 05. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  4. Alfons Weersink & John R. Livernois & Jason F. Shogren & James S. Shortle, 1998. "Economic Instruments and Environmental Policy in Agriculture," Canadian Public Policy, University of Toronto Press, vol. 24(3), pages 309-327, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  5. Marc O. Ribaudo, 2004. "Policy Explorations and Implications for Nonpoint Source Pollution Control: Discussion," American Journal of Agricultural Economics, American Agricultural Economics Association, vol. 86(5), pages 1220-1221, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  6. P. Dupraz & D. Vermersch & B. De Frahan & L. Delvaux, 2003. "The Environmental Supply of Farm Households: A Flexible Willingness to Accept Model," Environmental & Resource Economics, European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 25(2), pages 171-189, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  7. Katherine Falconer & Pierre Dupraz & Martin Whitby, 2001. "An Investigation of Policy Administrative Costs Using Panel Data for the English Environmentally Sensitive Areas," Journal of Agricultural Economics, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 52(1), pages 83-103. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  8. Rondeau, Daniel, 2001. "Along the Way Back from the Brink," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 42(2), pages 156-182, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  9. Wirl, Franz, 2004. "Thresholds in concave renewable resource models," Ecological Economics, Elsevier, vol. 48(2), pages 259-267, February. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  10. Genicot, Garance & Ray, Debraj, 2006. "Contracts and externalities: How things fall apart," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 131(1), pages 71-100, November. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  11. Dupraz, Pierre & Vanslembrouck, Isabel & Bonnieux, Francois & van Huylenbroeck, Guido, 2002. "Farmers' Participation in European Agri-Environmental Policies," 2002 International Congress, August 28-31, 2002, Zaragoza, Spain 24799, European Association of Agricultural Economists. [Downloadable!]
  12. Bengt Holmstrom, 1982. "Moral Hazard in Teams," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 13(2), pages 324-340, Autumn. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Full references

Statistics
Access and download statistics

Did you know? Springer Verlag was the first commercial publisher to be listed on RePEc.

This page was last updated on 2009-12-11.


This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Department of Economics, College of Liberal Arts and Sciences, University of Connecticut using RePEc data on a server sponsored by the Society for Economic Dynamics.