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Nationhood, the GATT ideal and a workable international trading system

Author

Listed:
  • P. GRAY

    (Rutgers University)

  • S. LUNDAN

    (Rutgers University)

Abstract

The goals of multilateral trade negotiations under the auspices of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (the GATT) have been developed in the context of the orthodox theory of commercial policy. An analysis is offered that shows why the GATT ideal may not be a flexible medium-term goal under existing conditions. Although the argument advanced has relevance to multilateral trade negotiations generally, the specifics of the Uruguay Round are not explored.

Suggested Citation

  • P. Gray & S. Lundan, 1994. "Nationhood, the GATT ideal and a workable international trading system," BNL Quarterly Review, Banca Nazionale del Lavoro, vol. 47(188), pages 99-113.
    • Handle: RePEc:psl:bnlaqr:1994:14
    as

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    File URL: http://ojs.uniroma1.it/index.php/PSLQuarterlyReview/article/view/10523/10408
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
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    4. Robert Z. Lawrence, 1991. "Efficient or Exclusionist: The Import Behavior of Japanese Corporate Groups," Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, Economic Studies Program, The Brookings Institution, vol. 22(1), pages 311-341.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    International trade and balance of payments; GATT;

    JEL classification:

    • F02 - International Economics - - General - - - International Economic Order and Integration
    • F40 - International Economics - - Macroeconomic Aspects of International Trade and Finance - - - General

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