Demande induite et réglementation de médecins altruistes
Abstract[fre] Les phénomènes de demande induite sont généralement interprétés comme des comportements de risque moral des médecins. Le premier apport de cet article est de révéler que ces phénomènes relèvent davantage d'un problème de sélection adverse que de risque moral. L'état de santé du patient étant un argument de la fonction d'utilité des médecins, nous utilisons cette caractéristique de la fonction objectif des médecins pour élaborer un mécanisme qui les incite à révéler la véritable pathologie de leurs patients. [eng] Induced demand and regulation of altruistic physicians. . Induction demand phenomena has usually been considered like a doctor's moral hazard behaviours. The first result of this paper is to reveal that these phenomena is a simple adverse selection problem. Thanks to the fact that health state is an argument of the doctor's utility, we build a mechanism where doctors have incentives to reveal the true illness of their patients.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Programme National Persée in its journal Revue économique.
Volume (Year): 53 (2002)
Issue (Month): 3 ()
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Web page: http://www.persee.fr/web/revues/home/prescript/revue/reco
Other versions of this item:
- David Bardey, 2002. "Demande induite et réglementation de médecins altruistes," Revue économique, Presses de Sciences-Po, Presses de Sciences-Po, vol. 53(3), pages 581-588.
- I18 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Health - - - Government Policy; Regulation; Public Health
- L51 - Industrial Organization - - Regulation and Industrial Policy - - - Economics of Regulation
- D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
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- Franc, Carine & Dumontet, Magali, 2013. "Male and Female GPs incomes: A study of the determinants through quantiles regressions," Economics Papers from University Paris Dauphine 123456789/11717, Paris Dauphine University.
- Philippe Batifoulier & Nicolas Da Silva, 2014. "The economic behaviour of doctors: medical altruism without an ethic?," EconomiX Working Papers 2014-9, University of Paris West - Nanterre la Défense, EconomiX.
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