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Transition vers un système par capitalisation dans un modèle de croissance endogène

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  • Pascal Belan

Abstract

[fre] Transition vers un système par capitalisation dans un modèle de croissance endogène. . Nous étudions la transition d'un système de retraite par répartition vers un système par capitalisation dans un modèle à générations imbriquées en croissance endogène (externalité positive du stock de capital agrégé sur la production). On suppose que les actifs sont différenciés par leur niveau de productivité. Deux cas sont étudiés selon qu'initialement le système par répartition propose des taux de remplacement identiques (système commutatif) ou décroissants avec le salaire passé (système redistributif). Nous montrons que, dans le premier cas, une politi­que de subvention de l'épargne permet de passer à un système par capitalisation de manière pareto-améliorante. Mais, dans le second cas, la modification du rendement de l'épargne peut s'avérer insuffisante pour réaliser une amélioration au sens de Pareto. Il faudra alors lui associer un système de redistribution sociale, sans quoi la transition pénalise les bas salaires. [eng] Transition towards a fully-funded system in an endogenous growth model. . We study the transition from an unfunded to a funded pension system in an endogenous growth overlapping generations model (with positive externality of aggregate capital stock on individual producers). We suppose that workers have different skill levels. We distinguish cases where the initial unfunded system provides either uniform or past wage decreasing replacement rates. In the first case, a saving-fostering subsidy can make both transition generations and future generations better off. In the second case, the shift in saving return may be insufficient to realize a Pareto-improving reform. Then one needs to keep a intragenerational redistribution scheme.

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Bibliographic Info

Article provided by Programme National Persée in its journal Revue économique.

Volume (Year): 52 (2001)
Issue (Month): 6 ()
Pages: 1205-1226

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Handle: RePEc:prs:reveco:reco_0035-2764_2001_num_52_6_410381

Note: DOI:10.2307/3503203
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  1. BELAN, Pascal & MICHEL, Philippe & PESTIEAU, Pierre, . "Pareto-improving social security reform," CORE Discussion Papers RP -1372, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
  2. Martin Feldstein, 1998. "Privatizing Social Security," NBER Books, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc, number feld98-1.
  3. Homburg, Stefan, 1990. "The Efficiency of Unfunded Pension Schemes," EconStor Open Access Articles, ZBW - German National Library of Economics, pages 640-647.
  4. Brunner, Johann K., 1996. "Transition from a pay-as-you-go to a fully funded pension system: The case of differing individuals and intragenerational fairness," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 60(1), pages 131-146, April.
  5. Boadway, R. & Marchand, M. & Pestieau, P., 1990. "Pay-as-you-go social security in a changing environment," CORE Discussion Papers 1990054, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
  6. Peters, Wolfgang, 1991. "Public Pensions in Transition: An Optimal Policy Path," Journal of Population Economics, Springer, vol. 4(2), pages 155-75, May.
  7. BELAN, Pascal & MICHEL, Philippe & PESTIEAU, Pierre, 1996. "Pareto improving social security reform with endogenous growth," CORE Discussion Papers 1996057, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
  8. Breyer, Friedrich & Straub, Martin, 1993. "Welfare effects of unfunded pension systems when labor supply is endogenous," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 50(1), pages 77-91, January.
  9. Saint-Paul, Gilles, 1992. "Fiscal Policy in an Endogenous Growth Model," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 107(4), pages 1243-59, November.
  10. Martin Feldstein & Andrew Samwick, 1996. "The Transition Path in Privatizing Social Security," NBER Working Papers 5761, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  11. Martin Feldstein, 1998. "Introduction to "Privatizing Social Security"," NBER Chapters, in: Privatizing Social Security, pages 1-29 National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  12. Brunner, Johann K., 1993. "Redistribution and the efficiency of the pay-as-you-go pension system," Discussion Papers, Series 1 265, University of Konstanz, Department of Economics.
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