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Economie et ordre juridique de l'espace virtuel

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  • Philippe Fenoglio
  • Bruno Deffains
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    Abstract

    [fre] Économie et ordre juridique de l'espace virtuel. . L'objectif de cet article est de déterminer l'efficacité des dispositifs juridiques qui accompagnent le développement de l'Internet. Nous montrons que le modèle de l'analyse économique du droit est partiellement transposable à l'élaboration de l'ordre juridique de l'espace virtuel. En partant du constat d'une forte similitude des problèmes juridiques entre mondes réel et virtuel, nous expliquons la coexistence des règles de propriété et des règles de responsabilité. D'un point de vue normatif, l'importance des coûts de transaction et des asymétries d'information permet d'évaluer l'efficacité relative de chaque type de règle. Cependant, la mise en œuvre de ces dispositifs soulève des problèmes spécifiques compte tenu des caractéristiques technologiques et géographiques de l'Internet. L'espace virtuel ne connaît pas les frontières judiciaires, d'où les obstacles à l'intervention des tribunaux chargés d'appliquer les règles de droit. De ce fait, l'article se poursuit par une discussion sur la pertinence de la référence à la lex mercatoria dans le domaine de l'ordre juridique de l'Internet. La construction de cet ordre s'appuie en effet largement sur des mécanismes décentralisés. Toutefois, l'efficacité d'un tel dispositif requiert l'émergence de juridictions privées qui assurent la sélection et l'application des règles pour pallier les limites des tribunaux classiques. [eng] Economics and legal order of cyberspace. . The aim of this paper is to determine the legal regulation adapted to the development of Internet. We show that the law and economics model is partially transposable in cyberspace legal order. Starting from the statement of similarity between real and virtual world judicial problems, we explain the coexistence of the property rules and the liability rules. From a normative point of view, transaction costs importance and information asymmetries are the major determinants of the efficiency of each type of rule. However, because of the Internet technological and geographical characteristics, implementation of these rules raise specific problems. As cyberspace does not know about legal borders, some obstacles exist to the (centralized) regulation by courts charged to apply legal rules. Following, the paper studies the opportunity of a decentralized application with private jurisdictions and concludes with a discussion concerning the relevance from the reference to the lex mercatoria for the construction of the Internet legal order.

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    Bibliographic Info

    Article provided by Programme National Persée in its journal Revue économique.

    Volume (Year): 52 (2001)
    Issue (Month): 1 ()
    Pages: 331-347

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    Handle: RePEc:prs:reveco:reco_0035-2764_2001_hos_52_1_410293

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    Web page: http://www.persee.fr/web/revues/home/prescript/revue/reco

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    Cited by:
    1. Yannick Gabuthy & Nadège Marchand, 2004. "Does Resorting to Online Dispute Resolution Promote Agreements? Experimental Evidence," Working Papers 0401, Groupe d'Analyse et de Théorie Economique (GATE), Centre national de la recherche scientifique (CNRS), Université Lyon 2, Ecole Normale Supérieure.
    2. repec:hal:journl:halshs-00259457 is not listed on IDEAS
    3. Yannick Gabuthy, 2004. "Online Dispute Resolution and Bargaining," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 17(3), pages 353-371, May.

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