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Duopole de Bertrand, asymétrie d'information et bien-être collectif

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  • Michel Mougeot
  • Florence Naegelen

Abstract

[eng] Bertrand duopoly, asynmetric information and social welfare . . In this paper, we consider a market with two firms having a private information on their marginal cost. In this context of asynmetric information, we prove that a two stages mechanism is not optimal from a social welfare point of view. [fre] Duopole de Bertrand. Asymétrie d'information et bien-être collectif. . Cet article étudie la concurrence en prix dans un duopole lorsque les deux entreprises ont une information privée sur leur coût marginal. La solution en deux étapes consistant à dissocier la mise en concurrence par les prix de la détermination de la quantité échangée est comparée avec une politique optimale maxi­misant le surplus collectif compte tenu de la demande. Il est démontré que le mécanisme en deux étapes implique un bien-être collectif inférieur à celui que réalise un mécanisme en une étape définissant un transfert monétaire global et la quantité simultanément.

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  • Michel Mougeot & Florence Naegelen, 1991. "Duopole de Bertrand, asymétrie d'information et bien-être collectif," Revue Économique, Programme National Persée, vol. 42(6), pages 1027-1046.
    • Handle: RePEc:prs:reveco:reco_0035-2764_1991_num_42_6_409328
    DOI: 10.3406/reco.1991.409328
    Note: DOI:10.3406/reco.1991.409328
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Vives, Xavier, 1984. "Duopoly information equilibrium: Cournot and bertrand," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 34(1), pages 71-94, October.
    2. Roger B. Myerson, 1981. "Optimal Auction Design," Mathematics of Operations Research, INFORMS, vol. 6(1), pages 58-73, February.
    3. R. Schmalensee & R. Willig (ed.), 1989. "Handbook of Industrial Organization," Handbook of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, edition 1, volume 2, number 2.
    4. Vives, Xavier, 1985. "On the efficiency of Bertrand and Cournot equilibria with product differentation," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 36(1), pages 166-175, June.
    5. Florence Naegelen, 1990. "L'arbitrage qualité-prix dans les procédures d'appels d'offres," Économie et Prévision, Programme National Persée, vol. 96(5), pages 95-108.
    6. R. Schmalensee & R. Willig (ed.), 1989. "Handbook of Industrial Organization," Handbook of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, edition 1, volume 1, number 1.
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