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Avant-propos

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  • André Lapidus

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  • André Lapidus, 1987. "Avant-propos," Revue Économique, Programme National Persée, vol. 38(6), pages 1081-1094.
    • Handle: RePEc:prs:reveco:reco_0035-2764_1987_num_38_6_409025
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Alchian, Armen A & Demsetz, Harold, 1972. "Production , Information Costs, and Economic Organization," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 62(5), pages 777-795, December.
    2. Henry G. Manne, 1965. "Mergers and the Market for Corporate Control," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 73, pages 110-110.
    3. Robert Wilson, 1975. "Informational Economies of Scale," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 6(1), pages 184-195, Spring.
    4. James A. Mirrlees, 1976. "The Optimal Structure of Incentives and Authority Within an Organization," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 7(1), pages 105-131, Spring.
    5. Buchanan, Allen, 1985. "Ethics, Efficiency and the Market," OUP Catalogue, Oxford University Press, number 9780198285335, Decembrie.
    6. Marris, Robin & Mueller, Dennis C, 1980. "The Corporation, Competition, and the Invisible Hand," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 18(1), pages 32-63, March.
    7. Demsetz, Harold, 1969. "Information and Efficiency: Another Viewpoint," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 12(1), pages 1-22, April.
    8. Henry G. Manne, 1965. "Mergers and the Market for Corporate Control," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 73, pages 351-351.
    9. North, Douglass C, 1978. "Structure and Performance: The Task of Economic History," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 16(3), pages 963-978, September.
    10. Leibenstein, Harvey, 1979. "A Branch of Economics is Missing: Micro-Micro Theory," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 17(2), pages 477-502, June.
    11. Fama, Eugene F, 1980. "Agency Problems and the Theory of the Firm," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 88(2), pages 288-307, April.
    12. Furubotn, Eirik G & Pejovich, Svetozar, 1972. "Property Rights and Economic Theory: A Survey of Recent Literature," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 10(4), pages 1137-1162, December.
    13. Philippe Steiner & Alain Le Diberder & Laurent Schwab, 1985. "Une introduction à l'économie politique hétérodoxe : Marchands, salariat et capitalistes," Revue Économique, Programme National Persée, vol. 36(2), pages 411-424.
    14. De Alessi, Louis, 1983. "Property Rights and X-Efficiency: Reply," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 73(4), pages 843-845, September.
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    Cited by:

    1. Laurent Thévenot, 1989. "Équilibre et rationalité dans un univers complexe," Revue Économique, Programme National Persée, vol. 40(2), pages 147-198.

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