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Pouvoir de monopole et répartition salaires-profits

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  • David Encaoua
  • Bernard Franck

Abstract

[fre] Monopole power and distributive shares . David Encaoua, Bernard Franck. Starting from the theory tvhich relates relative factor shares to monopoly power, we try here to explain cross-industrial variations in the distribution of value-added. The model is tested upon a sample of 270 french industries for the year 1974. In the first section, we show that relative shares are significantly linked with a set of market structure variables which are determinants of monopoly power. Notably, the share of gross profits is an increasing function of sellers concentration.. In the second section, we take into account the internal structure of industries. We distinguish industries where most firms are isolated and single-product from industries dominated by subsidiaries of large industrial groups. These groups constitue a form of organisation which seems to us similar to the U.S. multidivisionnal corporation. The relation previously tested is still observed in the first category of industries but does not work any more in the industries where groups are strongly implanted. It seems so that, in these industries, distributive shares are not influenced by market power variables but rather by the properties of the structural organization of industrial groups which enables them to capture benefits of internal coordination and to secure a higher share of value-addes. [eng] Monopole power and distributive shares . David Encaoua, Bernard Franck. Starting from the theory tvhich relates relative factor shares to monopoly power, we try here to explain cross-industrial variations in the distribution of value-added. The model is tested upon a sample of 270 french industries for the year 1974. In the first section, we show that relative shares are significantly linked with a set of market structure variables which are determinants of monopoly power. Notably, the share of gross profits is an increasing function of sellers concentration.. In the second section, we take into account the internal structure of industries. We distinguish industries where most firms are isolated and single-product from industries dominated by subsidiaries of large industrial groups. These groups constitue a form of organisation which seems to us similar to the U.S. multidivisionnal corporation. The relation previously tested is still observed in the first category of industries but does not work any more in the industries where groups are strongly implanted. It seems so that, in these industries, distributive shares are not influenced by market power variables but rather by the properties of the structural organization of industrial groups which enables them to capture benefits of internal coordination and to secure a higher share of value-addes.

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Bibliographic Info

Article provided by Programme National Persée in its journal Revue économique.

Volume (Year): 33 (1982)
Issue (Month): 1 ()
Pages: 107-131

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Handle: RePEc:prs:reveco:reco_0035-2764_1982_num_33_1_408644

Note: DOI:10.2307/3501462
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Web page: http://www.persee.fr/web/revues/home/prescript/revue/reco

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