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Une nouvelle approche de l'agro-alimentaire: l'économie néo-institutionnelle

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  • Claude Ménard

Abstract

[fre] Le secteur agro-alimentaire offre un terrain privilégié d'enquête pour les deux grandes branches du programme de recherche néo-institutionnnelle : la branche micro-économique centrée sur les «structures de gouvernance» (ou modes organisationnels), et la branche institutionaliste privilégiant l'analyse de l'impact des « règles du jeu » sur les comportements et les performances des entités économiques. On trouve en effet dans l'agro-alimentaire une palette exceptionnellement riche de «modes organisationnels» et d'arrangements contractuels accompagnant ces formes d'organisation ; et la très forte interaction entre les institutions et l'organisation du secteur agricole, en raison des interventions de l'État, se prête particulièrement bien à l'analyse néo-institutionnelle. L'article rappelle les acquis fondamentaux de cette approche et souligne leur pertinence pour l'étude de ces problèmes. [eng] A new approach to the agro-food sector: the new institutional economics - The agro-food sector represents an exceptional domain of analysis for the two major branches of the research program in New Institutional Economics, i.e.: the microanalytics, focusing on the study of «governance structures», and the analysis of institutions, emphasizing the impact of the «rules of the games» on the behavior and performance of economic entities. On the first aspect, the agro-food sector offers a great variety of modes of organization and of contractual arrangements accompanying these modes. On the second aspect, all countries have experienced interactions between the institutional environment and the organization of the agricultural sector, particularly because of the role of state interventions. This paper summarizes some main developments in New Institutional Economics, with an emphasis on their relevance for the analysis of these problems.

Suggested Citation

  • Claude Ménard, 2000. "Une nouvelle approche de l'agro-alimentaire: l'économie néo-institutionnelle," Économie rurale, Programme National Persée, vol. 255(1), pages 186-196.
    • Handle: RePEc:prs:recoru:ecoru_0013-0559_2000_num_255_1_5170
    DOI: 10.3406/ecoru.2000.5170
    Note: DOI:10.3406/ecoru.2000.5170
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Knoeber, Charles R, 1989. "A Real Game of Chicken: Contracts, Tournaments, and the Production of Broilers," The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 5(2), pages 271-292, Fall.
    2. Allen, Douglas & Lueck, Dean, 1992. "Contract Choice in Modern Agriculture: Cash Rent versus Cropshare," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 35(2), pages 397-426, October.
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    1. Giacomini, Corrado & Mancini, Maria Cecilia, 2015. "Organisation as a key factor in Localised Agri-Food Systems (LAFS)," Bio-based and Applied Economics Journal, Italian Association of Agricultural and Applied Economics (AIEAA), vol. 4(1), pages 1-16, April.

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