Deposit Insurance as a Tool for Banking Supervision
Abstract[eng] After reminding of the economic justifications of bank regulation, this paper pays particular attention to one of the instruments of this regulation, the deposit insurance. While offering a protection to the depositors, the deposit insurance would allow to prevent bank runs and thus reduce the occurrence probability of a systemic crisis. We present the features of such a scheme identified as « optimal » in the academic literature in the sense that they avoid moral hazard and adverse selection phenomena. Thus, ideally, the system should be public and compulsory for all banks ; the guarantee should be limited and all-in price ; the premium paid by the banks should directly depends on each bank’s risk level. . JEL Classifications : G28
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Programme National Persée in its journal Revue d'économie financière (English ed.).
Volume (Year): 60 (2000)
Issue (Month): 5 ()
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Web page: http://www.persee.fr/web/revues/home/prescript/revue/ecofi
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- G28 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Government Policy and Regulation
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Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis, issue Win, pages 14-23.
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- Black, Fischer & Scholes, Myron S, 1973. "The Pricing of Options and Corporate Liabilities," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 81(3), pages 637-54, May-June.
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