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Quel rôle pour les organismes de capital-investissement sur le marché de la cession-reprise ?

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  • Françoise Bastie
  • Sylvie Cieply

Abstract

[eng] What role do private equity firms play on the institutional buy-out market ? . In this article, we show that private equity firms do not only provide external financing to buyers of firms but informational services too. They solve problems related to asymmetries of information the market of buy-out suffers from. We underline the specificity of private equity firms when they invest in buy-out. These financial institutions are not only the ones that are the most likely to reduce agency conflicts between external investors and acquirers, but they also limit the conflicts between potential acquirers and sellers. We also put into light the liquidity service and the confidentiality service private equity firms provide ever since they develop institutional buy-out. . JEL Classification : G24, G34, G39 [fre] Les organismes de capital-investissement jouent un rôle important sur le marché de la transmission. Ils financent le rachat de l’entreprise cible et participent à la résolution des conflits opposant cédants et repreneurs et pouvant conduire à l’échec du marché de la transmission. Lorsque ces institutions sont majoritaires dans le capital de la cible, dans le cadre d’opérations d’institutional buy out, elles fournissent, en plus, un service de contrepartie et de confidentialité particulièrement utile pour augmenter la liquidité du marché de la cession-reprise. . Classification JEL : G24, G34, G39

Suggested Citation

  • Françoise Bastie & Sylvie Cieply, 2008. "Quel rôle pour les organismes de capital-investissement sur le marché de la cession-reprise ?," Revue d'Économie Financière, Programme National Persée, vol. 93(3), pages 145-153.
    • Handle: RePEc:prs:recofi:ecofi_0987-3368_2008_num_93_3_5273
    DOI: 10.3406/ecofi.2008.5273
    Note: DOI:10.3406/ecofi.2008.5273
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Admati, Anat R & Pfleiderer, Paul, 1994. "Robust Financial Contracting and the Role of Venture Capitalists," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 49(2), pages 371-402, June.
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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • G24 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Investment Banking; Venture Capital; Brokerage
    • G34 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Mergers; Acquisitions; Restructuring; Corporate Governance
    • G39 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Other
    • G24 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Investment Banking; Venture Capital; Brokerage
    • G34 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Mergers; Acquisitions; Restructuring; Corporate Governance
    • G39 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Other

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