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Risque opérationnel et régulation du capital dans l’industrie de la gestion de fonds d’investissement en Europe

Author

Listed:
  • Bruno Biais
  • Catherine Casamatta
  • Jean-Charles Rochet

Abstract

[fre] Cet article analyse les déterminants et l’étendue du risque opérationnel dans l’industrie de la gestion de fonds d’investissement. Il présente les résultats d’une étude empirique sur l’ampleur et les sources de risque opérationnel des sociétés de gestion de fonds en Europe. Un modèle théorique souligne le rôle joué par la régulation du capital des sociétés d’investissement dans la réduction de ce risque. . Classification JEL : G23, G28 [eng] Operational risk and capital requirements in the European investment fund industry . This paper analyses the sources of operational risk in the investment fund industry. An empirical survey documents the extent and origin of operation losses across European fund management companies. We then construct a simple model to highlight the role of capital and capital requirements to limit operation risk. . JEL classification : G23, G28

Suggested Citation

  • Bruno Biais & Catherine Casamatta & Jean-Charles Rochet, 2005. "Risque opérationnel et régulation du capital dans l’industrie de la gestion de fonds d’investissement en Europe," Revue d'Économie Financière, Programme National Persée, vol. 79(2), pages 197-211.
    • Handle: RePEc:prs:recofi:ecofi_0987-3368_2005_num_79_2_3981
    DOI: 10.3406/ecofi.2005.3981
    Note: DOI:10.3406/ecofi.2005.3981
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    2. Chevalier, Judith & Ellison, Glenn, 1997. "Risk Taking by Mutual Funds as a Response to Incentives," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 105(6), pages 1167-1200, December.
    3. Judith Chevalier & Glenn Ellison, 1999. "Career Concerns of Mutual Fund Managers," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 114(2), pages 389-432.
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    5. Biais, Bruno & Casamatta, Catherine & Rochet, Jean-Charles, 2003. "Operational Risk and Capital Requirements in the European Investment Fund Industry," IDEI Working Papers 239, Institut d'Économie Industrielle (IDEI), Toulouse.
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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • G23 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Non-bank Financial Institutions; Financial Instruments; Institutional Investors
    • G28 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Government Policy and Regulation
    • G23 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Non-bank Financial Institutions; Financial Instruments; Institutional Investors
    • G28 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Government Policy and Regulation

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