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Un système financier plus efficient pour obtenir de meilleures performances économiques : une tentative d'identification des priorités

Author

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  • Francesco Giavazzi
  • Alberto Giovannini

Abstract

[fre] Il est aujourd’hui admis qu’une économie ne peut être performante que s’il existe des institutions facilitant la production et la distribution efficiente des biens et services. Il en va de même dans le secteur financier. Les auteurs analysent ainsi l’efficience des institutions judiciaires et leurs effets sur le fonctionnement des marchés financiers, ainsi que le lien entre la qualité du droit des sociétés, l’application efficiente de la législation et les performances économiques. Puis deux initiatives dans ce domaine sont examinées : . - la comparaison de deux projets de loi sur la réforme du Code des société en Italie ; . - les initiatives visant à la création, dans toute l’Europe, d’agences de renseignements sur les emprunteurs et de registres publics des crédits. . Classification JEL : G14, G28

Suggested Citation

  • Francesco Giavazzi & Alberto Giovannini, 2001. "Un système financier plus efficient pour obtenir de meilleures performances économiques : une tentative d'identification des priorités," Revue d'Économie Financière, Programme National Persée, vol. 62(2), pages 79-91.
    • Handle: RePEc:prs:recofi:ecofi_0987-3368_2001_num_62_2_3111
    DOI: 10.3406/ecofi.2001.3111
    Note: DOI:10.3406/ecofi.2001.3111
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • G14 - Financial Economics - - General Financial Markets - - - Information and Market Efficiency; Event Studies; Insider Trading
    • G28 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Government Policy and Regulation

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