IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/prs/ecstat/estat_0336-1454_2008_num_413_1_7034.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Le caractère régressif des taxes indirectes : les enseignements d'un modèle de microsimulation

Author

Listed:
  • Nicolas Ruiz
  • Alain Trannoy

Abstract

[fre] La fiscalité indirecte française regroupe à la fois des taxes sur la valeur (TVA, taxe sur les conventions d’assurance, etc.) et, pour certains biens (alcools, tabacs, produits pétroliers, etc.), des droits portant sur les quantités consommées (ou droits d’accises) qui s’ajoutent à la TVA. Taxes et droits d’accises peuvent se ramener pour tous les biens à un taux unique implicite . sur la valeur. La fiscalité indirecte pèse davantage sur les ménages modestes: ces ménages consacrent en effet une part beaucoup plus grande de leur budget aux biens soumis aux accises que les ménages aisés. Le premier décile acquitte ainsi 4,3 % de son revenu en ces taxes, le dernier décile simplement 1,3 %. La mesure de l’impact d’une réforme (prenant la forme d’une modification des taux ou des accises au moyen de leurs taux implicites) suppose de pouvoir disposer d’une modélisation des comportements des consommateurs vis-à-vis des produits soumis à ce type d’impôt. Pour cela, on estime pour ces biens des élasticités-prix et des élasticités-revenu ensuite intégrées à un modèle de micro-simulation. Ces élasticités dérivent de fonctions de demandes dont l’estimation utilise des indices de prix dits «personnalisés» qui tirent parti pour chaque grand poste des différences de structure de consommation entre les différents ménages, ceci afin de disposer d’une variabilité dans les indices de prix. Ce modèle permet de mesurer l’impact de deux mesures: la première espace les taux de TVA, la seconde augmente les accises en diminuant le taux de TVA, les deux réformes étant conçues à solde budgétaire constant. Chacune opère un transfert de charge fiscale d’ampleur limitée, favorable aux revenus modestes dans le cas de la première et à leur détriment pour la seconde. La relative similarité des profils de consommation moyenne par déciles de revenu et la forte hétérogénéité des profils de consommation au sein de chaque décile atténuent en effet l’impact de ces réformes en matière de redistribution. Le caractère régressif des taxes indirectes: les enseignements d’un modèle de microsimulation [ger] Die indirekten Steuern in Frankreich umfassen Wertsteuern (MwSt, Steuern auf Versicherungsverträge usw.), Steuern auf bestimmte Erzeugnisse (Alkohol, Tabak, Erdölprodukte usw.) sowie Steuern auf verbrauchte Mengen (Verbrauchsteuern), die zur MwSt hinzukommen. Abgaben und Verbrauchsteuern können für alle Güter zu einem einheitlichen impliziten Satz auf den Wert erhoben werden. Die indirekten Steuern belasten die Haushalte mit geringem Einkommen stärker; denn diese geben einen viel größeren Teil ihres Budgets für verbrauchsteuerpflichtige Güter aus als wohlhabende Haushalte. Die Haushalte des ersten Dezils bringen somit 4,3 % ihres Eikommens für Steuern und diejenigen des letzten Dezils lediglich 1,3 % auf. Um die Auswirkungen einer Reform (d. h. einer Änderung der MwSt-oder Verbrauchsteuersätze mittels ihrer impliziten Sätze) messen zu können, bedarf es einer Modellierung der Verhaltensweisen der Verbraucher gegenüber solchen steuerpflichtigen Produkten. Zu diesem Zweck werden für diese Erzeugnisse Preis-und Einkommenselastizitäten geschätzt, die danach in ein Mikrosimulationsmodell einfließen. Diese Elastizitäten leiten sich von Nachfragefunktionen ab, bei deren Schätzung so genannte •personalisierte“ Preisindizes verwendet werden, die für jeden großen Posten die Konsumstrukturunterschiede zwischen den verschiedenen Haushalten berücksichtigen, um über eine Variabilität bei den Preisindizes zu verfügen. Mit diesem Modell lassen sich die Auswirkungen zweier Maßnahmen messen: bei der ersten werden die MwSt-Sätze gestaffelt und bei der zweiten die Verbrauchsteuern durch Senkung des MwSt-Satzes erhöht, wobei beide Reformen bei unverändertem Haushaltssaldo durchgeführt werden. Bei jeder Reform erfolgt eine begrenzte Übertragung der Steuerlast, die im Falle der ersten Reform den Haushalten mit niedrigem Einkommen zugute kommt und bei der zweiten sie belastet. Die relative Ähnlichkeit der Profile des durchschnittlichen Konsums pro Einkommensdezil und die starke Heterogenität der Konsumprofile innerhalb eines jeden Dezils schwächen die Auswirkungen dieser Reformen im Hinblick auf die Umverteilung ab. Regression der indirekten Steuern: Ergebnisse eines Mikrosimulationsmodells [spa] La fiscalidad indirecta francesa reúne a la vez tributos sobre el valor (IVA, tasa de los convenios de seguros sociales, etc.) y, para algunos bienes (alcoholes, tabaco, productos petroleros, etc.), derechos sobre las cantidades consumidas (o derechos especiales) que se añaden al IVA. Tributos e impuestos especiales pueden reducirse para todos los bienes a una tasa única . implícita sobre el valor. La fiscalidad indirecta pesa más sobre los hogares modestos: en efecto, estos hogares dedican un parte mucho más importante de su presupuesto a los bienes sometidos a los especiales que los hogares acomodados. El primer decil paga así 4,3 % de su ingreso en estas tasas, el último decil sólo 1,3 %. La medida del impacto de una reforma (en forma de modificación de las tasas o los impuestos especiales mediante sus tasas implícitas) supone poder disponer de un modelo de los comportamientos de los consumidores respecto a los productos sometidos a este tipo de tasa. Para esto, se estiman las elasticidades-precio y elasticidades-ingreso de estos bienes, integradas a continuación en un modelo de microsimulación. Éstas derivan de funciones de demandas cuya estimación utiliza los índices de precios denominados •personalizados” que sacan provecho para cada gran puesto de las diferencias estructurales de consumo entre los diferentes hogares, y ello para disponer de una variabilidad en los índices de precio. Este modelo permite medir el impacto de dos medidas: el primero espacia la tasa de IVA, el segundo aumenta los impuestos especiales disminuyendo la tasa de IVA, ambas reformas concebidas para saldo presupuestario constante. Cada uno opera un transferencia de carga fiscal de amplitud limitada, favorables a los ingresos modestos en el caso de la primera y a su detrimento en el segundo. La relativa similitud de los perfiles de consumo promedio por deciles de ingreso y la gran heterogeneidad de los perfiles de consumo en el interior de cada decil atenúan, en efecto, el impacto de estas reformas en términos de redistribución. El carácter regresivo de los tributos indirectos: enseñanzas de un modelo de microsimulación [eng] French indirect taxation includes taxes on value (VAT, tax on insurance agreements, etc.) and, for some goods (alcohol, tobacco, petroleum products, etc.), duties on quantities consumed (or excise duties) which are added to VAT. For all goods, taxes and excise duties can represent a single implicit tax on value. Indirect taxation is a disproportionate burden on lower-income households, which spend a much higher proportion of their budgets on goods which are subject to excise duties than more affluent households. The first income decile spends 4.3% of its income on these taxes; the last decile just 1.3%. The measure of the impact of a reform (in the form of a change in rates or in excise duties by means of their implicit levels) assumes that we can model consumer responses to products which are subject to this type of taxation. To this end, for these products we estimate price-flexibilities and income-flexibilities which are then integrated into a micro-simulation model. These flexibilities are derived from supply functions estimated using •personalised” price indexes which in each major area of spending make use of differences in consumption patterns between different households. This aims to build variability into the price indexes. This model allows us to measure the impact of two measures, the first of which spaces out the VAT rates, while the second increases excise duties and reduces the rate of VAT (both reforms were drawn up using constant budget balances). Each gives rise to a tax burden transfer of limited extent, which favours low-earners in the first instance and disadvantages them in the second. The relative similarity of the average consumption profiles by income decile and the wide variation between consumer profiles within each decile lessen the impact of these reforms on redistribution. The Regressive Nature of Indirect Taxes: Lessons from a Micro-Simulation Model

Suggested Citation

  • Nicolas Ruiz & Alain Trannoy, 2008. "Le caractère régressif des taxes indirectes : les enseignements d'un modèle de microsimulation," Économie et Statistique, Programme National Persée, vol. 413(1), pages 21-46.
  • Handle: RePEc:prs:ecstat:estat_0336-1454_2008_num_413_1_7034
    DOI: 10.3406/estat.2008.7034
    Note: DOI:10.3406/estat.2008.7034
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://doi.org/10.3406/estat.2008.7034
    Download Restriction: no

    File URL: https://www.persee.fr/doc/estat_0336-1454_2008_num_413_1_7034
    Download Restriction: no

    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.3406/estat.2008.7034?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Véronique Nichèle & J.M. Robin, 1995. "Simulation of indirect tax reforms using pooled micro and macro French data [Evaluation des effets budgétaires et redistributifs de réformes de la fiscalité indirecte française]," Post-Print hal-02699381, HAL.
    2. Nichele, Veronique & Robin, Jean-Marc, 1995. "Simulation of indirect tax reforms using pooled micro and macro French data," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 56(2), pages 225-244, February.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Brannlund, Runar & Nordstrom, Jonas, 2004. "Carbon tax simulations using a household demand model," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 48(1), pages 211-233, February.
    2. Delgado, Miguel A & Miles, Daniel, 1997. "Household Characteristics and Consumption Behaviour: A Nonparametric Approach," Empirical Economics, Springer, vol. 22(3), pages 409-429.
    3. Crawford, Ian & Laisney, Francois & Preston, Ian, 2003. "Estimation of household demand systems with theoretically compatible Engel curves and unit value specifications," Journal of Econometrics, Elsevier, vol. 114(2), pages 221-241, June.
    4. Kurt Kratena & Ina Meyer & Michael Wüger, 2009. "Ökonomische, technologische und soziodemographische Einflussfaktoren der Energienachfrage," WIFO Monatsberichte (monthly reports), WIFO, vol. 82(7), pages 525-538, July.
    5. Arabatzis, Garyfallos & Klonaris, Stathis, 2009. "An analysis of Greek wood and wood product imports: Evidence from the linear quadratic aids," Forest Policy and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 11(4), pages 266-270, July.
    6. Christoph Böhringer, Florian Landis, and Miguel Angel Tovar Reaños, 2017. "Economic Impacts of Renewable Energy Production in Germany," The Energy Journal, International Association for Energy Economics, vol. 0(KAPSARC S).
    7. Jérôme Adda, 2007. "Behavior towards health risks: An empirical study using the “Mad Cow” crisis as an experiment," Journal of Risk and Uncertainty, Springer, vol. 35(3), pages 285-305, December.
    8. Creedy, John & Sleeman, Catherine, 2006. "Carbon taxation, prices and welfare in New Zealand," Ecological Economics, Elsevier, vol. 57(3), pages 333-345, May.
    9. Desiderio Romero-Jordán & José Félix Sanz-Sanz, 2009. "Energy Taxes and Household Compliance with the Kyoto Protocol," Public Finance Review, , vol. 37(2), pages 142-169, March.
    10. Frank Denton & Dean Mountain, 2011. "Taxing a Commodity with and without Revenue Neutrality: A Calibrated Theoretical Consumer Equilibrium Model," Atlantic Economic Journal, Springer;International Atlantic Economic Society, vol. 39(3), pages 261-271, September.
    11. Romero-Jordán, Desiderio & del Río, Pablo & Jorge-García, Marta & Burguillo, Mercedes, 2010. "Price and income elasticities of demand for passenger transport fuels in Spain. Implications for public policies," Energy Policy, Elsevier, vol. 38(8), pages 3898-3909, August.
    12. Brännlund, Runar & Nordström, Jonas, 2001. "Modelling Consumer Demand and Household Labour Supply: Welfare Effects of Increasing Carbon Taxes," Umeå Economic Studies 571, Umeå University, Department of Economics.
    13. Toshinobu Matsuda, 2007. "Linearizing the inverse quadratic almost ideal demand system," Applied Economics, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 39(3), pages 381-396.
    14. Audrey Berry, 2017. "Compensating households from carbon tax regressivity and fuel poverty: a microsimulation study," Policy Papers 2017.08, FAERE - French Association of Environmental and Resource Economists.
    15. Thomas Douenne, 2018. "The vertical and horizontal distributive effects of energy taxes," Working Papers 2018.10, FAERE - French Association of Environmental and Resource Economists.
    16. Oya Pinar Ardic & Burcay Erus & Gurcan Soydan, 2010. "An evaluation of indirect taxes in Turkey," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 30(4), pages 2787-2801.
    17. Frank T. Denton & Dean C. Mountain, 2011. "Taxing a Commodity With and Without Revenue Neutrality: An Exploration Using a Calibrated Theoretical Consumer Equilibrium Model," Quantitative Studies in Economics and Population Research Reports 445, McMaster University.
    18. Paolo Liberati, 2000. "Did VAT change redistribute purchasing power in Italy?," Working Papers in Public Economics 40, University of Rome La Sapienza, Department of Economics and Law.
    19. Berry, Audrey, 2019. "The distributional effects of a carbon tax and its impact on fuel poverty: A microsimulation study in the French context," Energy Policy, Elsevier, vol. 124(C), pages 81-94.
    20. Paolo Liberati, 2001. "The Distributional Effects of Indirect Tax Changes in Italy," International Tax and Public Finance, Springer;International Institute of Public Finance, vol. 8(1), pages 27-51, January.

    More about this item

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:prs:ecstat:estat_0336-1454_2008_num_413_1_7034. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Equipe PERSEE (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://www.persee.fr/collection/estat .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.