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Réglementation bancaire et stabilité des systèmes financiers européens dans la perspective de l'UEM

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  • Jacques Le Cacheux
  • Antoine Magnier

Abstract

[spa] Reglamentaciôn bancaria y estabilidad de los sistemas financieros europeos en la perspectiva de la UEM . La puesta en prâctica del Mercado ûnico y la perspectiva de la Union econômica y monetaria deberîan acarrear un refuerzo de la integraciôn de los mercados y de los servicios financieros en la Comunidad Europea. La integraciôn conllevarâ una creciente interdependencia de los sistemas bancarios y de pagos y una intensificaciôn de la competencia entre entes financieros. . Las modalidades de financiaciôn de las economfas serân mâs eficientes pero la Comunidad podrîa enfrentarse a nuevos factores de inestabilidad, que los dispositivos . reglamentarios y prudenciales nacionales no pueden prever. Aunque han logrado cierta armonizaciôn, las disposiciones comunitarias a este respecto siguen perfectibles. . Una creciente coordinaciôn de los supervisores de los diferentes paîses, un sistema de seguro de depôsitos mâs cohérente y mâs conocido del pûblico, un concepto mâs unificado del prestamista en ultima instancia y el establecimiento de unas autoridades supranacionales mejorarîan el dispositivo de control. [fre] Réglementation bancaire et stabilité des systèmes financiers européens dans la perspective de l'UEM L'entrée en vigueur du Marché unique et la perspective de l'Union économique et monétaire devraient entraîner un renforcement de l'intégration des marchés et des services financiers dans la Communauté européenne. Cette intégration s'accompagnera d'une interdépendance accrue des systèmes bancaires et de paiements et d'une intensification de la concurrence entre établissements financiers. . Les modes de financement des économies en seront plus efficaces mais la Communauté pourrait être confrontée à de nouvelles sources d'instabilité, dont les dispositifs réglementaires et prudentiels nationaux ne peuvent prendre toute la mesure. Bien qu'ayant permis une certaine harmonisation, les dispositions communautaires dans ce domaine restent perfectibles.. Une coordination accrue des superviseurs des différents pays, un système d'assurance dépôts plus cohérent et mieux connu du public, une conception plus unifiée du prêteur en dernier ressort et la mise en place d'autorités supra-nationales amélioreraient le dispositif de contrôle. [ger] Bankenregelung und Stabilitàt der europàischen Finanzsysteme vor dem Hintergrund der WWU . Die Vollendung des Europàischen Binnenmarktes und die Perspektive der Wirtschafts- und Wàhrungsunion werden sicherlich eine verstàrkte Integration der Màrkte und der Finanzdienste in der Europàischen Gemeinschaft zur Folge haben. Einhergehen wird diese Integration mit einer stârkeren Verflechtung der Banken- und Zahlungssysteme sowie einer Zunahme des Wettbewerbs zwischen den Finanzinstituten. . Die Finanzierungsmôglichkeiten der Volkswirtschaften kônnen dadurch nur verbessert werden. Da die nationalen Regelungen nicht voll zum Tragen kommen, kônnte die Gemeinschaft allerdings mit neu en Quellen der Instabilitât . konfrontiert werden. Die EG-Bestimmungen, die zweifelsohne in diesem Bereich eine gewisse Harmonisierung gebracht haben, sind jedoch noch verbesserungsbedurftig. . Eine stârkere Zusammenarbeit der Aufsichtsbehôrden der einzelnen Lander, die Schaffung eines kohârenteren und transparenteren Depotsicherungssystems, eine einheitlichere Konzeption des "lender of last resort" und die Errichtung supranationaler Behôrden wùrden einen wesentlichen Beitrag zur Verbesserung der Beaufsichtigungssysteme leisten. [eng] Banking Controls and the Stability Financial Systems in EMU . The advent of the Single European Market and the prospect of Economic and Monetary Union should result in a closer integration of the European Community's markets and financial services. This integration will be accompanied by the increased interdependence of the banking and payment systems and intensified competition between financial establishments. . The methods used to finance economies will become more efficient, but the Community could be faced with new sources of instability unable to be fully managed by the national regulatory and prudential mechanisms. Although Community measures taken in this area have led to a certain degree of harmonization, improvements could still be made. . The supervisory device could be enhanced by better co-ordination between the supervisors in the different countries; creating and making the public more aware of a more consistent deposit insurance system; a more united notion of the lender of last resort; and the setting up of supranational authorities.

Suggested Citation

  • Jacques Le Cacheux & Antoine Magnier, 1993. "Réglementation bancaire et stabilité des systèmes financiers européens dans la perspective de l'UEM," Économie et Statistique, Programme National Persée, vol. 262(1), pages 63-74.
  • Handle: RePEc:prs:ecstat:estat_0336-1454_1993_num_262_1_5722
    DOI: 10.3406/estat.1993.5722
    Note: DOI:10.3406/estat.1993.5722
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