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Les partages inégaux de successions entre frères et soeurs

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Author Info

  • Luc Arrondel
  • Anne Laferrère

Abstract

[eng] The Uneven Sharing of Estates between Brothers and Sisters . Estates favouring one or more direct heirs to the detriment of the others seems to be less frequent in France than in the United States. French legislation limits the sum to which will clauses may unevenly share estates between children to an available portion. In total, 7 % of all inheritances that have formed the subject of a tax declaration are inequitable. So in eight out of ten cases, death is preceded by donations. The sharing therefore tends more to consummate the disparities resulting from these previous gifts than to offset them. . A link can be found between inequitable practice and certain characteristics of the deceased : large assets . and income, self-employed status, old age, a number of heirs, and relatively fixed and concentrated assets are more inclined to result in clauses in favour of one or more of the children. On the other hand, it is a lot more difficult to statistically determine which of the children is favoured. When a disparity exists, it is more often a case of one child being favoured than one child being excluded. . Economic theory proposes a range of models to explain this intra-family behaviour, which spans from altruism to selfishness. However, the data used in these cases only allow a rough link to be made between the extremely complicated reality and the advanced formalizations. [fre] Les partages inégaux de successions entre frères et soeurs . Les successions avantageant un ou plusieurs des héritiers directs au détriment des autres semblent moins fréquentes en France qu'aux Etats-Unis. La loi limite en effet dans notre pays à une quotité disponible le montant sur lequel peuvent jouer des dispositions testamentaires inégalitaires entre les enfants. Au total, 7 % des successions ayant fait l'objet d'une déclaration fiscale sont inégalitaires, et alors dans huit cas sur dix, le décès était précédé de donations : le partage tend ainsi a consacrer les inégalités résultant de ces dons antérieurs, plus qu'à les compenser. . Certaines caractéristiques du défunt sont liées à une pratique inégalitaire : un patrimoine et des revenus importants, un statut d'entrepreneur indépendant, un âge . avancé, de nombreux héritiers, un patrimoine peu liquide et peu diversifié inclinent davantage à des dispositions en faveur d'un ou plusieurs des enfants. Il semble en revanche beaucoup plus difficile de déterminer statistiquement quel est l'enfant favorisé. Quand il y a inégalité, c'est plus souvent un seul enfant qui est favorisé que le cas inverse où un seul est exclu. . La théorie économique propose un éventail de modèles pour expliquer ces comportements intra-familiaux, allant de l'altruisme pur à l'égoïsme : les données exploitées ici ne permettent cependant qu'imparfaitement de faire le lien entre la réalité, très complexe, et les formalisations avancées. [spa] Las particiones desiguales de sucesiones entre hermanos y hermanas . Las sucesiones que aventajarîan a uno o a varios herede- ros directos en detrimento de los otros parecen ser menos frecuentes en Francia que en los Estrados Unidos. En efecto, la ley limita a una porcîon disponible el monto sobre el cual pueden ventilarse disposiciones testamenta- rias desiguales entre los hijos. En total, un 7 % de las sucesiones que han sido objeto de una declaraciôn fiscal no ponen sobre el mismo pie de igualdad a los herederos. De ese modo, en ocho de cada diez casos el fallecimiento fue precedido de donaciones : la partition tiende asî a consagrar las desigualdades résultantes de estas donaciones anteriores mas que a compensarlas. . Algunas caracteristicas del difunto estân relacionadas con una prâctica no igualitaria : un patrimonio e ingresos importantes, un estatuto de empresario independiente, una edad avanzada, numerosos herederos, un patrimonio poco diversificado y con poca liquidez conducen a la toma de disposiciones a favor de uno o varios hijos. Por el contrario, résulta mâs difïcil determinar estadîsticamente cual es el hijofavorecido por la herenda. Cuando existe ladesigual- dad, frecuentemente un solo hijo se ve favorecido mâs que en el caso inverso en que uno solo se ve excluido. . La teorîa econômica propone un abanico de modelos para explicar estas comportamientos intra-familiares que van del altruismo puro al egoismo : los datas analizados aquî per- miten, de manera imperfecta, establecer un vînculo entre la realidad, muy compleja, y las formalizaciones propuestas.

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Bibliographic Info

Article provided by Programme National Persée in its journal Economie et statistique.

Volume (Year): 256 (1992)
Issue (Month): 1 ()
Pages: 29-42

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Handle: RePEc:prs:ecstat:estat_0336-1454_1992_num_256_1_5669

Note: DOI:doi:10.3406/estat.1992.5669
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Web page: http://www.persee.fr/web/revues/home/prescript/revue/estat

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Cited by:
  1. Andrew Ellul & Marco Pagano & Fausto PAnunzi, 2008. "Inheritance Law and Investment in Family Firms," CSEF Working Papers 204, Centre for Studies in Economics and Finance (CSEF), University of Naples, Italy, revised 30 Nov 2009.
  2. Arrondel, L. & Laferrere, A., 1998. "Taxation and Wealth Transmission in France," DELTA Working Papers 98-13, DELTA (Ecole normale supérieure).
  3. Guillaume Allegre, 2013. "Comment peut-on défendre un revenu de base ?," Sciences Po publications info:hdl:2441/6ggbvnr6mun, Sciences Po.
  4. François-Charles Wolff & Luc Arrondel, 1998. "La nature des transferts inter vivos en France : investissements humains, aides financières et transmission du patrimoine," Économie et Prévision, Programme National Persée, vol. 135(4), pages 1-27.
  5. repec:spo:wpecon:info:hdl:2441/6ggbvnr6munghes9oehj92o15 is not listed on IDEAS

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