Decentralization and electoral accountability
AbstractOn the basis of aggregated and individual-level survey data of national and regional elections in Spain, this paper analyzes how economic voting is impacted by vertical and horizontal dimensions of clarity of responsibility. Our findings suggest that economic voting is enhanced when mechanisms of accountability are simple.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Pion Ltd, London in its journal Environment and Planning C: Government and Policy.
Volume (Year): 28 (2010)
Issue (Month): 2 (April)
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Web page: http://www.pion.co.uk
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- Santiago Lago-Pe�as, 2005.
"Evolving federations and regional public deficits: testing the bailout hypothesis in the Spanish case,"
Environment and Planning C: Government and Policy,
Pion Ltd, London, vol. 23(3), pages 437-453, June.
- Santiago Lago-Peñas, . "Evolving Federations and Regional Public Deficits: Testing the Bailout Hypothesis in the Spanish Case," Studies on the Spanish Economy 193, FEDEA.
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