I examine sociospatial aspects of urban governance, focusing on the case of a downtown- redevelopment stadium project. In many US central cities, wider political economic processes have led to the formation of governance coalitions guided by the interests of private sector agents. The case of Bank One Ballpark in Phoenix, Arizona, demonstrates how political economic conditions were sources of an uneven bargaining context during the process of project negotiations. Because of this unevenness, interests of profiteers were favored at the expense of others. Organized resistance during each phase of stadium building and concentration of increasing revenues in the hands of fewer business operators reflect uneven consequences. These were desired outcomes of the corporate-led coalition’s strategy for expansion through the manipulation of state authority and the exclusionary production of space. I expand the application of urban-regime analysis to examine the role of unevenness in local governance.
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Volume (Year): 26 (2008) Issue (Month): 6 (December) Pages: 1177-1196 Download reference. The following formats are available: HTML
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